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Ethical trade has emerged in an effort to re-embed markets in-line with social, 
cultural and economic values. Particularly, it tries to trace ethical values throughout 
processes of globalized production in order for producers and consumers to be 
empowered through their participation in international trade. This study examines 
how the Alliance for Responsible Mining’s (ARM) fair trade gold initiative and the 
Kimberley Process Certifications Scheme’s (KPCS) effort to eliminate conflict 
diamonds are integrating ethics into their production-supply chains. This 
investigation aims to understand how knowledge management supports 
innovations within this sector. Data was collected from global as well as local 
stakeholders, with field visits to Peru and Colombia in support of the research on 
ARM, and through a national case study of the KPCS in Sierra Leone. The study 
finds that it is very challenging for a single initiative to enable meaningful 
participation of both local communities and international policymakers. However, it 
also revealed that the coordination of knowledge from these stakeholders is 
essential for reaching ethical objectives, and, in order to ‘scale-up’ or ‘scale-down’ 
initiatives. To reach its potential, ethical trade requires buy-in from producers, 
trading intermediaries, consumers and policy-makers alike. The study therefore 
advocates for strategic learning within and between initiatives to increase 
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Today as more than half a century ago, the global economy appears to be 
reaching an impasse, as laissez-faire economic policies are being challenged by 
a global movement to re-embed markets in line with the social, cultural and 
economic values of the day (Polanyi, 1944). This movement stems from a 
growing criticism of the liberalization and deregulation policies of the last half 
century for not sufficiently addressing environmental, labour and human rights 
issues. It has mobilized actors around the world to develop structures and 
processes that facilitate more equitable international trade. In fact, neo-liberal 
globalisation has become its own antithesis by providing the conditions 
necessary for its reform. It is doing so by facilitating the movement of goods, 
technology, peoples and most importantly ideas – all the things necessary to 
create a dynamic economic system that reflects societal values.  
 
This study looks at two examples of how production is being embedded in ethical 
principles in the artisanal and small-scale mining sector. It examines the Alliance 
for Responsible Mining’s (ARM) venture to certify gold fair trade and the 
Kimberley Process Certification Schemes (KPCS) effort to stop the trade in 
conflict diamonds. The research will focus on how decisions are made, 
implemented and validated within these production-supply chains. Particularly, it 
tries to trace how these initiatives are drawing upon various types of knowledge 
in order to reach their organisational objectives. The study uses a lens of 
knowledge management to guide its analysis and reveal how processes of 
learning support innovations in international trade. 
 
1.1 Research Objectives  
 
 The following research objectives have been identified for this study:  
 
• Identify the policy and governance framework of two ethical trading 
initiatives in the Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) sector. 
 
• Investigate the institutions established to facilitate viable ethical trading 
initiatives 
 
• Critically examine how knowledge is translated into innovations within 
these initiatives 
 
The next section reviews the literature surrounding ethical trade, supply-chain 
governance, and knowledge management in order to establish a conceptual 




Box 1.1 Ethical Consumer Drivers 
 
Consumer activism has been driven by a 
number of important factors including: 
 
• increased information (through 
globalised telecommunications) 
about the unequal terms of trade; 
 
• NGO activism and campaigning; 
 
• the development of niche markets 
and alternative trade organisations; 
 
• the increasing number of capable 
Southern networks producing ethical 
goods; and 
 
• adoption of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) reporting and 
verifications strategies.    
 
 
1.2 Ethical Trade 
 
Ethical trade is part of a diverse transnational movement that seeks to re-embed, 
or re-regulate globalised markets in line with social, environmental, and cultural 
values (Kiely, 2002; Nash, 2001). Goals that have been articulated through this 
movement include labour and environmental standards, conflict prevention, and 
anti-corruption measures1. Broadly defined, ethical trade seeks “to incorporate 
social and environmental goals alongside commercial ones” (Burns and 
Blowfield, 1999: 4). Corporate social responsibility (CSR), social enterprises, fair 
trade and other niche ethical branding are all a part of this description. A second 
and narrower definition of ethical trade that will be used for this study is: any 
trade that incorporates ethical considerations into its supply chain governance 
(Heeks and Duncombe, 2004: 202). This definition will be used because it allows 
the study to focus upon the transactions that govern relationships within the 
production-supply as it travels within globalised markets.  
                
The ethical trade movement is one outlet 
of a growing global movement of activism 
that seeks to address inequalities 
between producer and consumer 
countries in a globalized economy2. As 
information about the unequal distribution 
of wealth in global production systems 
becomes more prevalent, there has been 
a corresponding growth in ethical 
consumers “who are integrating social 
and environmental concerns into their 
purchasing power” (Strong, 1996). This 
trend of consumer activism is expected to 
continue to grow (Environics, 2001), with 
some sectors growing at approximately 
15% per annum, and expectations that it 
will soon surpass growth in many 
traditional sectors (Doanne, 2001: 11).  
                                                 
1 One example of a comprehensive set of ethical guidelines for responsible business has been developed by 
the Ethical Consumer Research Association, and is reported on in their publication “Ethical Consumer,” 
where companies are comprehensively graded, based on five criteria  of social and environmental 
performance (www.ethicalconsumer.org).  
 
2 Globalisation has drastically transformed production systems through technological improvements in 
transportation, telecommunication, and financial systems. Unfortunately, significant negative side-effects 
have emerged as developing countries try to make themselves more attractive for foreign investment. This 
has included a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of wages, social, environmental standards and corporate taxes 




         
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has developed in tandem with ethical 
trade. CSR is a movement towards corporate citizenship rather than corporations 
operating solely within a profit-maximizing ideology. Although the motivation for 
CSR is beyond the scope of this paper, it has been argued that the adoption 
CSR is not due solely to altruism but rather it is an emerging part of corporations’ 
sustainability strategy. A positive aspect of CSR codes is the dialogue about, and 
mainstreaming of, best-practices within sectors. However, the capability of such 
codes to work as tools for international development has yet to be established 
(Blowfield, 2005, Barrientos, 2000).  
 
Another emerging sector within the spectrum of ethical trade is the market for 
niche ethical goods, conceptualized initially by alternative trading movements. 
Fair trade is one of the most compelling and organized examples of a 
commercial trading network that has developmental objectives. Fair trade 
generally works with small-scale producers to implement social, economic, 
environmental and other production standards. By charging a social premium, 
Fair Trade certified producers are able to receive a guaranteed minimum price 
for their goods as well as access to credit (FLO, 2008: online). The Fair Trade 
movement has transformative goals to develop “trading structures and practices 
in favour of the poor and disadvantaged” (FTF, 2008: online).  
 
The FairTrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) is the international standards and 
certification body for the movement. FLO is a non-profit multi-stakeholder 
umbrella association composed of over 20 national labelling initiatives. Initially 
FLO only certified agriculture; however, it is considering extending certification to 
other products such as minerals and manufactured goods. As of 2006, 1.4 million 
workers in 57 countries throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America were involved 
in FLO certification (FLO, 2008: online). Moreover, sales of FLO certified 
products are growing at rates of about 30% per year3. FLO represents an 
important example of how alternative trading movements are becoming drivers to 
change market and consumer expectations of acceptable procurement and 
production practices.    
 
1.3 Ethical Trade in Artisanal and Small-scale Mining 
 
This study will look at how ethical trade is unfolding in the extractive industries, 
particularly in precious minerals and gems mined under artisanal and small-scale 
(ASM) conditions. The primary reason for focusing on ASM is that there are 
existing, and fairly comprehensive, ethical trading initiatives within this sector. 
This is not so for larger scale mechanized mining, which is operating under 
voluntary CSR codes.        
                                                 
3 Percentage growth in sales of  selected FLO certified products between 2004 and 2005 : tea (33%), coffee 
(40%), bananas (29%), fresh fruit (61%), sugar (85%), honey (7%),  juices (30%), rice (23%), cocoa 
(35%),  flowers (12%), wine (83%), dried fruit (29%), sport balls (16%) (FLO, 2008:online)  
[Accessed from: http://www.fairtrade.net/latest_figures.html]  
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Currently, the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is the only 
sector-wide initiative to regulate large-
scale mining. It seeks to support 
accountability and transparency in 
resource-rich countries “through the 
verification and full publication of 
company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining” (EITI, 
2008: online). Thus far, the EITI is being 
implemented by 25 countries. Azerbaijan 
is the only compliant country while all 
others remain candidates of the process. 
Norway is the only developed country to 
participate in this global process (EITI, 
2009: online).  
 
The Initiative for Responsible Mining 
Assurance (IRMA) is another multi-sector 
effort to develop standards and assure 
mine site compliance with environmental, 
social and human rights issues. When the 
standards are completed, and IRMA 
becomes operational, this will be an important step forward for large-scale mining 
because the sector will use independent third party verification to monitor 
compliance with standards.   
 
In artisanal and small scale mining (ASM), there are several initiatives that 
currently seek to regulate and monitor the production-supply chain for precious 
minerals.  The two initiatives that will be studied here are: 1) the Alliance for 
Responsible Mining (ARM) to certify gold fair trade, and 2) the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to certify diamonds as conflict free. A 
major reason for choosing the above mentioned, is that they both have been 
launched on behalf of the development of artisanal and small-scale miners of 
precious minerals.   
 
According to latest International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates, artisanal 
and small scale mining (ASM) , a decade ago, was employing  between 11 to 13 
million people in over 30 countries;  between 80 and 100 million people were 
depending on it,  as part of their livelihood strategies (ILO, 1999). Estimates of 
ASM’s contribution to global markets then suggested that between 20-25% of all 
non-fuel minerals were being produced by small scale miners (Echavarria citing 
Jennings, 2004) and generated close to 2 billion dollars worth of gold, gems and 
other precious metals (ILO, 1999). These statistics indicate the significance of 
ASM in the global economy, as well as the number of people who participate and 
rely on ASM as a primary livelihood strategy.  
Box 1.2 Voluntary Codes of Conduct 
 
One key critique of the EITI and other 
codes of conduct has been their 
voluntary and non-binding nature, which 
brings into question the accountability of 
their accreditation.  
 
Yet, it has been noted that private 
governance regimes have been 
creating global governance, even in the 
absence of any formalized regulating 
institution. This is because multi-
stakeholder dialogues are fast 
becoming a standard against which 
companies are being judged in the 
global economy; thus the “new face of 
regulation” (Williams, 2004: 464).  
 
This debate will not be settled until a 
comprehensive evaluation of CSR 
codes of conduct is done, and 
mechanisms are developed to 
standardize the codes with some sort of 




Artisanal and small-scale miners typically work in harsh physical and ecological 
conditions, with a limited ability to claim their rights (Barreto, 2003). Oftentimes 
ASM communities are located in very remote locations that do not have access 
social services, such as schools and hospitals or basic infrastructure including 
electricity and access to potable water.  Increasingly, there is recognition that 
ASM needs to become a formalized and legalized economic activity so that it can 
be adequately regulated and perceived as a viable livelihood option (Barreto, 
2003). There are several international initiatives to address social and 
environmental concerns associated with ASM. ARM and the KPCS represent two 
such initiatives.   
 
In fact, ARM and KPCS are being examined together here for several reasons. 
The first is that diamonds and gold are associated and/or complementary 
commodities.  In addition, work has been done to look at the broader context of 
ethical jewellery — for instance, the 2007 Ethical Jewellery Summit organized 
under the auspices of the Madison Dialogues. Finally, valuable insights can be 
gained from examining the trajectories of how these initiatives are governed.  
ARM and its guiding set of principles, Standard Zero, have used community 
mobilization and activism in the South as well as a fair trade4 developmental 
model that focuses on private certification and consumer awareness. On the 
other hand, the KPCS is being implemented in an inter-governmental arena with 
national governments, industry, international civil society, as well as the support 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  
 
1.4 Governance of Ethical Production-Supply Chains  
 
Governance is the second broad theme that will be addressed in order to 
construct the theoretical and analytical tools necessary for this study. Broadly, 
governance refers to the values, rules, institutions, and processes through which 
people and organizations attempt to work towards common objectives, make 
decisions, generate authority and legitimacy, and exercise power (CIDA, 2008: 
online). Governance happens in both public and private domains. This study is 
primarily interested in the governance of multi-stakeholder ethical trading 
initiatives.  
 
                                                 
4 “Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, and seeks greater equity 
in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and 
securing the rights of, disadvantaged producers and workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade 
organizations (backed by consumers) are actively engaged in supporting producers in awareness raising and 
in campaigning for changes in the rules and practices of conventional international trade.” (FLO, 2008) 





According to Vallejo and Hauselman (2004) multi-stakeholder governance has 
“gained recognition as valid mechanisms to develop and implement social and 
environmental responsible management practices towards sustainable 
development” (Ibid:1). They design a framework where the viability of multi-
stakeholder governance depends on its ability to achieve an optimal balance 
between legitimacy and effectiveness. In their analysis, initiatives gain legitimacy 
through their “representation, inclusiveness and transparency” as well as the 
“ability of the process to engage stakeholders in a meaningful dialogue in which 
they feel ownership and the possibility to derive benefits” (Ibid:.4). These 
perceived benefits to participation are the primary reasons for stakeholder 
engagement, and refer to the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives to also 
“deliver their objectives well and fast” (Ibid: 5).  
 
A further subset of the literature on governance of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
speaks to the importance of institutional capacity to implement, verify and adapt 
to new information or circumstances. For instance, Bitran et al (2006) elaborates 
on the subject of institutional capacity by suggesting that a formalized co-
ordinating body is needed to communicate between multiple heterogeneous 
partners. This study focuses upon trends of collaboration within supply chains, 
and provides a compelling argument for how a co-ordinating body is a necessary 
enabler for institutional growth and adaptation, as well as to sustain these 
collaboratively governed initiatives (Ibid:  9).   
 
Recognizing the synergies between the Birtran et al (2006) analysis and this 
study, the concept of chain governance will also be integrated here. The Gereffi 
et al (1994) framework for global commodity chain governance5 and value chain 
governance6 (Porter, 1985; Hayter, 2004; Gereffi et al, 2005) will be used as 
strategic tools to assess the viability (legitimacy and effectiveness) of the ARM 
and KPCS multi-stakeholder initiatives under investigation.   
 
Utilising the structure of the production-supply chain will enable this study to 
unearth patterns of authority and influence, power relations and the rules of 
engagement that occur in and between upstream and downstream stakeholders, 
as the commodity travels through each value adding stage from extraction to 
retail (Gereffi et al, 2005). As these chains are pre-existing and tangible 
structures, they can be theoretically adapted to capture relevant information at 
multiple points of the production-supply chain. 
 
Potentially, this may include the processes surrounding commodity extraction, 
processing, manufacturing, branding, marketing and other steps on the way to 
the consumer. At each of these stages, actors must negotiate procedures, 
                                                 
5 Global Commodity Chains “refers to the whole range of activities involved in the design, production and 
maketing of a product” (Gereffi et al, 2005) 
 
6 Global Value Chains “describe a set of discrete value-adding stages performed by the firm during a 
product’s journey from conception, assembly and packaging to advertising and sale” (Hayter, 2004: 9) 
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operations, distributions of gains, and other aspects of organisational culture that 
add to their information, knowledge and decision-making base. The study also 
postulates that information can enter the production-supply chain from more 
global discourses. The ethical consumer and CSR movements represent 
information systems that interact and can influence ethical supply chains. Other 
research on sustainable mining and international development issues are also 
sources of knowledge. Thus, this study will examine how information that enters 
into ethical production-supply chains supports learning and fosters innovations 
within those chains.  
 
1.5 Knowledge Management and Organisational Learning  
 
Now that the relevant literature on ethical trade and governance has been 
introduced and contextualized within the two cases, the next necessary building 
block for our study will look at how and where knowledge is generated and 
managed in these initiatives.   
 
Knowledge management can be thought of as the creation, legitimization and 
sharing of knowledge (Ferran-Urdaneta, 1999), while organisational learning 
refers to how  the knowledge is used and integrated to reach overall objectives 
(Kidd et al, 2003). A substantial amount of research has been done on 
knowledge management as it relates to supply chain effectiveness; it has found 
that there is a clear need for, and observable benefits from, effectively managing 
upstream and downstream knowledge (Kidd et al, 2003; Chaston et al, 1999; 
Phan and Perdis, 2000). While many  have looked at knowledge management in 
terms of improving productive capacity within supply chains, this rationale is also 
applicable to evolving interpretations of productivity such as the triple bottom-line 
of  accountability (financial, social and environmental). 
 
Likewise, Johnson and Lundvall’s (2000) analysis of the learning economy 
suggests that systems of learning and innovation are rapidly changing via 
processes of globalization and that “interconnections between geographically 
different parts of the world have considerably increased and this has multiplied 
the learning opportunities” (Ibid.: 4). Nevertheless, they note that,  like other 
aspects of globalisation, the advantages of globalised learning systems are not 
equally accessible to all social groups or regions (Ibid.:4). Thus, the transmission 
of knowledge is a negotiated process that is subject to power relations — for 
instance, financial resources to participate and set the agenda, access to 
information, or gender dimensions. 
 
In order to address these inequalities, Duncombe and Heeks (2002) emphasise 
the potential of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate 
access to information by different actors within ethical trading initiatives. Through 
a review of several ethical trading cases, they highlight how ethical trade 
emerged within a context of learning and innovation and illustrate how strong 




This research recognises that multiple sets of information and knowledge exist 
along the points of the production-supply chain, and these reflect stakeholder, 
regional and/or human experiences and needs. For this information to be 
translated into useful knowledge that benefits the entire chain, the necessary 
channels must be established for it to be integrated into learning and innovation 
processes. This argument corroborates with Johnson and Lundvall (2000) ‘s 
conclusions that an integrated technical, organisational and institutional learning 
strategy is necessary to merge the economic, social and ecological aspects 
necessary for sustainable development (Ibid.:7)  
 
Thus, if sufficient systems are in place, knowledge can permeate into ethical 
trading initiatives in several ways to facilitate organisational learning for improved 
governance. This study differentiates between three methods by which data are 
captured, interpreted, and disseminated in these initiatives. The first is 
‘instrumental’ information which is particular to a specific initiative and provides 
qualitative and quantitative data to inform that process. For instance, this may 
include production and market share statistics, or wellness and security 
indicators for labourers, miners, and their beneficiaries. The second and related 
type of information is ‘evaluative’ knowledge, drawn from a particular initiative 
that retroactively assesses its processes and outcomes to gauge its own 
progress or performance and generates information to support improvements in 
its practices. Thirdly, ‘referential’ knowledge is defined as any type of information 
that is outside the specific initiative, but adds to its knowledge bank and capacity 
to reach its objectives.  
 
Referential knowledge is distinctive because it reflects a wide range of 
information that can be gathered by upstream, downstream or collaborative 
knowledge platforms. Accordingly, downstream research may focus upon issues 
related to consumer behaviour and verification strategies for ethical claims. 
Upstream research, on the other hand, may focus upon issues such as how 
public policies aligned with ethical initiatives in countries of operation increase 
the latter’s impact and replicability.  Collaborative research is being used more 
and more as a tool to share information between upstream and downstream 
researchers and networks, coordinate research methods and priorities, and 
facilitate policy consultation and advocacy on an international scale (Engelhard 
and Box, 1999).  
 
1.6 Collaborative Research for Interdisciplinary Learning  
 
Collaborative research aims to effectively coordinate interdisciplinary research 
priorities, agendas, and methods amongst multiple partners, so as to derive 
results that can be translated into usable policies. It is increasingly being seen as 
an effective mechanism for building the capacity of Southern researchers and 
institutions (Etherington, 2006; Bradley, 2007). Additionally, collaborative 
research is also an effective strategy to build trust and enable mutual learning 
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amongst partners. This is because it increases the opportunities for spatially 
separated researchers to work together. In this way it builds the capability of 
Southern and Northern institutions and individuals to engage in future 
collaborative initiatives (Bradley, 2007: 30).  
 
Oftentimes, these research networks operate with varying degrees of 
formalisation and decentralisation. They are usually spearheaded by core 
leaders who are central to facilitating the process and act as the “sparkplug” 
(Engelhard and Box, 1999: 8) for building membership to the network and co-
ordinating the research agenda. If networks are interpreted as useful by 
members, they can evolve and develop into a formal structure with a permanent 
coordinating secretariat (Ibid.: 6).  
 
It has been noted that development research which is demand-led and generated  
by, or in collaboration with, Southern partners is more likely to have actionable 
and applied outcomes (Nair and Menon, 2002; Danielson and Digby, 2006). In 
response to these and other findings, there has been a greater incentive for, and 
movement towards, channelling research funds through collaborative initiatives. 
The aim is for collaborative research to have the triple function of strengthening 
research capacity, generating more robust data, and increasing the likelihood of 
being implemented.   
 
In artisanal mining, there are several multi-stakeholder research initiatives that 
have provided referential knowledge about the sector. One example is the Mining 
Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD)7, an independent two 
year process of consultation and research in 2000 – 2002, with the objective “of 
understanding how to maximise the contribution of the mining and minerals 
sector to sustainable development at the global, national, regional and local 
levels” (MMSD, 2008:online).  
 
The MMSD used a collaborative, yet decentralized process to carry out the 
objectives of the project. It “tried to operate on the basis of the principle of 
subsidiarity: that decisions should be taken at the lowest level at which the 
interested parties can be brought together to participate in the decision” 
(Danielson and Digby, 2006:10). The MMSD established regional partners in 
North America, South America8, Southern Africa and Australia, with a lesser 
degree of research in Eastern Europe, Asia, and West Africa. The reasons for 
this decentralized approach included encouraging meaningful participation, 
alliances building, and capturing regional differences while also facilitating global 
learning (MMSD, 2000:7). 
                                                 
7 The MMSD was co-ordinated by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in 
the UK, with support from the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the 
Global Mining Initiative (GMI).  
 
8 The IDRC’s Mining Policy Research Initiative (MPRI), then based in its Latin America and Caribbean 





Another, more permanent structure is the Communities and Small Scale Mining 
Secretariat (CASM), housed at the World Bank. CASM is a multi-stakeholder 
networking and co-ordination facility, launched in 2001 to improve coordination 
between funding and executing agencies on issues of ASM (CASM(a), 2008: 
online). A further CASM objective is to support knowledge transfer and 
innovation within its granting portfolio.   
 
For example, CASM has several grants to support research and publications and 
financial resources available for ‘learning events,’ that bring stakeholders 
together (CASM (a) 2008: online). Another resource that CASM facilitates via its 
website is the ‘Knowledge Centre,’ which contains databases of documents, 
projects, and contacts to support access to information surrounding this sector. 
Since 2003, CASM has been involved in arranging approximately 28 events 
throughout Africa, Asia, South America, North America, Europe and Australasia. 
Through its global scope, it has become a significant co-ordinating institution 
within the ASM sector for networking stakeholders, supporting the transfer of 
knowledge, and developing integrated approaches to formalise small-scale 
mining, so that ASM may become a mechanism for economic prosperity and 
development.  
 
There are other collaborative research initiatives that are adding to the 
knowledge of ethical production-supply chains. Some of these networks have 
been created in tandem with the ethical trading initiatives to fulfill a knowledge 
deficit, and others are parallel initiatives where knowledge is able to undergo 
cross-fertilisation. Later in this paper, a host of collaborative research initiatives 
will be discussed as they relate to achievements of ethical trade, production-
supply chain governance, or sustainable ASM mining.  
 
Through this introduction of various subjects such as ethical trade, artisanal and 
small scale mining, multi-stakeholder governance, knowledge management and 
collaborative research, the literature review has outlined the scope of this 
research. After a brief discussion of the data collection methods, in-depth case 
studies will be presented for the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) and the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Finally, a concluding section 
will discuss the role that knowledge management has had towards the 
achievements of these initiatives, areas for future learning, and the potential role 
for capacity building organisations to support ethical trade’s developmental 







There is growing awareness that effective “natural resource management requires close 
collaboration between research disciplines, policy-makers and stakeholders at all levels to strike 
a balance between different (potentially conflicting) perspectives and objectives”  
(Hubacek et al, 2006: 1). 
 
As previously outlined, this study will look at two ethical trading initiatives for 
artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) through a lens of knowledge 
management. After a review of the relevant fields of literature, this study 
premises that channels must be established for information to be transmitted 
through the production-supply chain to foster learning and innovations. Through 
qualitative research of the ARM and KPCS initiatives, the study aims to identify 
the institutionalized processes of learning that have been developed for these 
initiatives to reach their organisational objectives.  
 
This research does not aim to be exhaustive and will build upon the work of 
previous studies. It refers to public and internal documents about these initiatives 
as part of a discourse analysis to compile and cross reference data. Semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders working within these initiatives were 
undertaken to learn about the governance and learning processes within these 
networks. The process of interviewing was reinforced by a further analysis of 
documentation gathered through this data collection process.   
 
Open ended, semi-structured interviews were done from Ottawa and at the field 
sites. This included email and telephone discussions and physical meetings with 
respondents from Canada, USA, India and the EU. Interviews were also 
conducted at the field sites in Peru, Colombia and Sierra Leone. Peru was 
chosen because the research coincided with a regional meeting of ARM 
stakeholders. Subsequently, research was also conducted in Colombia where 
the ARM secretariat is based. Sierra Leone was selected to be the national case 
of the KPCS because it is a target country of the process that has experienced 
significant progress towards their national implementation. Moreover, Sierra 
Leone is an English speaking country and a host organisation was identified to 
support this research. 
 
In total, 38 interviews were conducted with stakeholders of the Alliance for 
Responsible Mining and 66 interviews were conducted with global and national 
stakeholders within the KPCS. Semi-structured interviews were chosen because 
of the multi-faceted actors who are involved in the upstream and downstream 
ethical supply chains. For instance, labour and community associations in the 
sites of extraction will have different experiences, knowledge and needs than 
refiners and jewellers that work in downstream branding, marketing and retailing. 
Thus, standardized questions were not used because the research sought to 
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reveal in-depth and context specific information. (Please see the attached 
questionnaires appended to this document)  
 
In order to identify adherents, the researcher worked with host organisations at 
each research site. This included the Secretariat of the Alliance for Responsible 
Mining in Peru and Colombia, and the NGO Network Movement for Justice and 
Development in Freetown, Sierra Leone.  Host organisations were instrumental 
in identifying and introducing the researcher to respondents. After initial 
introductions snowball sampling was also used.  
 
The research in Latin America included attending four days of meetings in Lima 
and a learning tour to the Sur Medio Region of Peru. Participation is this event 
enabled broad access to ARM’s stakeholders such as representatives from the 
Board of Directors, pilot projects, support organisations and other key actors. 
Several weeks were also spent in Colombia, working out of the ARM 
Secretariat’s headquarters and collecting more information on the organisation’s 
governance and implementation strategies. 
 
For the KPCS, substantial research, was done with global respondents including 
the representatives from the Indian Government who chaired the process in 
2008, the chairs of the Working Group on Monitoring and Statistics, and with 
observers from industry and civil society organisations (CSOs). For the national 
case study in Sierra Leone, interviews were carried out with government 
representatives, local and international CSOs, donors, and traders in Freetown. 
With the help of a research assistant, perspectives were also gathered from 
producers, license holders, dealers, regulators, CSOs, donors based in the Kono 
mining district.  
 
The intent of this research is to provide an overview of governance and 
organisational learning strategies of ARM and the KPCS. It also aims to look at 
the sector as a whole, and what types of opportunities there are to scale-up 
these individual initiatives to support the sustainable mining and ethical jewellery 
sectors. Thus, peripheral actors such as government representatives, advocacy 
organisations, and members from social networks, were also enlisted to take part 
in this study.  
 
The researcher also engaged with knowledge communities which are being 
mobilized to generate and share information, and/or advocate and build support 
within this sector. This included the Madison Dialogues, a virtual forum that has 
been established to support the development of ethical trading in metals and 
jewellery.  Through this type of participation, the study will try to postulate what 
types of future investments could support greater innovation within this sector. 
 
Due to the breadth of this study – two initiatives and two continents, this study 
cannot claim to be able to capture all types of information and learning flows that 
exist. However, it does try to highlight patterns of successes and challenges by 
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examining organisational structures to see if they are conducive to knowledge 
management. Moreover, through the semi-structured interview process the study 
seeks to vocalize the perceptions of actors working within these initiatives 
through their personal accounts of interacting within the production-supply chain 





The Alliance for Responsible Mining 
 
The Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) (www.communitymining.org) is a 
Colombia based organisation with global aspirations to certify gold fair trade. It 
aims at making artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) a ‘formalized, organized 
and profitable activity’ (ARM a, 2008:online). ARM seeks to fulfill its mandate by 
creating an integrated and traceable global production supply chain to benefit 
small-scale miners, and by building on growing consumer consciousness about 
the ethics of trade. ARM currently uses an ongoing multi-stakeholder process for 
adapting fair trade principles and standards that meet the needs of ASM. 
                                                                             
ARM was born out of the Oro Verde 
or Green Gold (www.greengold-
oroverde.org) corporation which 
has been producing and trading 
gold since 2004, through a 
responsible and traceable supply 
chain.  
 
In 2007, Corporación Oro Verde 
(COV) produced approximately 6.5. 
kg of certified green gold and 
associated platinum from the 194 
Afro-Colombian families from the 
Chocó region of Colombia who 
collectively own COV in partnership 
with two NGO´s, Amichoco and 
Fundamojarras. Oro Verde has 
successfully demonstrated that 
there is a vibrant niche market of 
consumers who are demanding that 
jewels they adorn are produced in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
As a response to this, the 
leadership of Oro Verde9 decided to 
‘scale-up’ their model by incubating 
ARM. This decision was made because Oro Verde  realized that, for ethical 
jewellery to become a substantial niche market, greater volumes of gold would 
be required than could be produced solely at the Oro Verde operations (Interview 
with Catalina Cock-Duque, May 9 2008). Which implied reaching out to many 
                                                 
9 Oro Verde is owned and operated by the Community Councils of Condoto and Tado, and two Colombian 
based NGOs, Mojarras Foundation, and  Fundacion Amigos del Choco Colombia (AMICHOCO). 
Box 3.1 The Evolution of Certified Gold 
 
ARM seeks to develop a standard of 
responsible ASM that is applicable to various 
types of mining.  
 
While the gold produced in Chocó is alluvial 
gold, it does not require extensive processing 
to separate the gold from other minerals. Many 
other terrains do require substantial processes 
such as mercury amalgamation or cyanide 
agitation tanks to separate the gold from other 
mineral deposits. 
 
While mercury and cyanide can be used to 
separate gold from other minerals, Standard 
Zero requires that the use of these substances 
be adequately managed to reduce 
environmental and health impacts. 
Furthermore, there is also a process of 
phasing them out at certified operations.  
 
In the case of Corporación Oro Verde, there is 
an environmental premium paid to the Chocó 
miners which is over and above the fair trade 
premium because their gold is mercury and 
cyanide free (ARM a, 2007: 23).   
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more gold-mining sites outside Oro Verde’s territory. Thus, ARM was created as 
a global initiative to develop a universal set of standards applicable to various 
methods of extraction and regional geographies, such as alluvial or hard-rock 
mining. It seeks “to develop a comprehensive international system for ASM that 
includes standard setting, independent certification, producer support and market 
facilitation” (Cock-Duque, 2007:12). 
 
Presently, ARM is testing Standard Zero at nine pilot sites in Latin America. This 
phase involves exploring how the standards are implemented on the ground and 
the manner in which gold can be traced from mine to showroom. ARM is also 
working to develop the downstream supply chain processes for exporting, 
refining, distributing and branding the gold. This concurrent process is necessary 
because pilots need to have a distribution channel once they fulfill the fair trade 
criteria so that they can accrue benefits from this model.   
 
The following sections will examine how ARM is implementing these objectives. 
Initially, ARM’s governance structure will be reviewed; this defines the roles and 
responsibilities of each chamber or instance. The section will discuss the viability 
of this governance structure to reaching the organisation’s stated objectives. The 
second section will elaborate on ARM’s strategic objectives and will highlight 
examples of their progress to date. The next section will examine ARM’s 
philosophy of knowledge, with special attention to knowledge generation. This 
includes looking at the types of knowledge and methods by which these are 
shared within the network, as well as how parallel networks have also supported 
ARM’s institutional development.  
 
3.1 ARM’s Governance  
 
ARM is currently developing its governance structure to suit its mission and 
organisational needs. During 2004-2008 the Alliance went through an incubation 
stage, marked by a formalising and piloting period. Through this process it 
moved from being an association of members to becoming an alliance of multi-
stakeholders.  
 
ARM has been incubated by COV, with the intention of becoming a global 
organisation to co-ordinate the growth of responsible artisanal mining (ARM 
website). ARM was initially visualized to become a third party certifier of the 
green gold produced by Chocó miners. However, it was subsequently identified 
that the most pressing issue was the number of mines producing responsible 
gold. It was recognized that for COV to grow, the market for responsible jewellery 
would also have to grow, and the Chocó operations did not have the production 
capability to significantly impact consumer tastes (Interview with Catalina Cock 
Duque, May 9 2008). Furthermore, there was a genuine desire to work towards 
creating sustainable livelihoods for small-scale miners. Thus, ARM was created 
to be a co-ordinating and standards setting NGO that develops a fair trade 




The Alliance was formally registered in June 2008 in Colombia, although it began 
working in 2004. During that period ARM worked under the umbrella of the 
COV’s legal status, though maintaining its own decision making arrangements 
while preparing to become an autonomous organisation10. Now COV belongs to 
and participates in the Alliance, while continuing to market and distribute Oro 
Verde branded gold to international customers. Oro Verde will benefit from its 
investment in ARM through establishing a third party verifier for ASM, as well as 
expanding its movement to create further consumer awareness (Interview with 
Lina Villa May 16 2008).   
 
A substantial amount of work was needed to define the most conducive structure 
for ARM’s objectives. For instance, ARM decided to use a fair trade system over 
an alternative certification system, partly in light of impressive benefits already 
accrued to agriculturalists through fair trade11. Other strengths of the fair trade 
system include a long term alliance between producers, traders and consumers 
as well as access to pre-financing and credit. ARM reached these decisions in 
part as a result of an internal study which it undertook,  entitled “Towards A 
Global Certification Scheme for Responsible Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining“ 
(Cock-Duque, 2007). This piece reviewed a majority of the core social 
entrepreneurial and standard setting and assurance organisations12.   
 
Another key decision that was made out of this review process was that ARM 
would not be a membership organisation at this stage of its development.  After 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of membership based 
organisations, another structure was identified that would capture many of the 
benefits of a membership organisation, without its disadvantages (Cock-Duque, 
2007:17). ARM particularly wanted to ensure that the structure would enable 
meaningful participation, broad based representation, transparency, 
accountability and expertise, while avoiding the administrative costs of a 
membership association, such as large time and financial expenditures. Through 
consulting directly with staff from other standard setting and assurance 
organisations reviewed in their internal study, as well as experts of multi-
                                                 
10 ARM is housed in the offices of AMICHOCO,  a Colombian NGO that manages Corporacion Oro 
Verde. COV is jointly owned by AMICHOCO, the Community Councils of Condoto and Tado, and 
Fundamojarras. 
 
11 Fair trade has experienced substantial and sustained growth in many agricultural sectors. In 2006  the 
movement had grown  by 41%  over the previous year, including  growth in cocoa (91%), coffee (53%), tea 
(41%) and banana’s (31%). www.fairtrade.net 
 
12 An internal comparative analysis of governance structures and financial sustainability was conducted on 
six standard setting organisations for sustainable trade,  in order to develop an optimal model for ARM. 
The organisations referred to in this study were: The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Fair Trade 
Labelling Organisation (FLO), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), Social Accountability International 
(SAI), the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) and the Sustainable 




stakeholder governance13,  ARM concluded that a membership based structure 
did not necessarily mean a representative balance of power between different 
stakeholders (Cock-Duque 2007:17).  
 
Instead ARM decided to structure itself as a multi-stakeholder alliance organised 
around three broad sectors of participants: producer organisations, support 
organisations, and trading/distributing organisations. ARM’s governance 
structure is comprised of four main chambers: Board of Directors, Stakeholder 
Alliance, Technical Committee and a Secretariat. Formal terms of reference 
(TOR) are established with individuals and organisations who participate in these 
structures, so that roles and responsibilities are defined clearly (ARM b, 2008: SA 
TOR; ARM c, 2008: TC TOR).  
       
Figure 3.1 ARM’s Governance Structure  
               
(Cock-Duque 2007: 19)  
Board of Directors  
 
The Board of Directors (BoD) is the instance that is responsible for overseeing 
the strategic direction of ARM, and provides leadership capacity to the Alliance. 
                                                 
13 Chairperson of ARMs BoD Catalina Cock Duque engaged in a dialogue with Nancy Vallejo who co-
authored the 2004 study “Governance of Multi-stakeholder Processes” with Pierre Hauselmann. This study 
was produced for the Sustainable Commodity Initiative which is a joint venture of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD).   
 
The framework developed in Vallejo and Hauselmann’s (2004) study was an important component behind 
the conceptual framework developed within this research (see pg 5 of this study). Briefly, the study 
proposes that successful multi-stakeholder initiatives  depend on their ability to find a balance between 
legitimacy (representation and participation) and effective implementation of relevant objectives.  A more 




In fact, “board members are elected14, based on  their specialized knowledge 
related to ASM” (Cock-Duque 2007, 20). They are accountable in their own 
personal capacity and play a strategising and advisory role for ARM.  
 
Several provisions in Directors’ terms of reference are meant to foster their broad 
based and meaningful participation on the Board. These clauses are to ensure 
that the main stakeholder constituencies are fairly represented, and gender and 
regional representation is considered. Currently, the BoD is comprised of seven 
individuals, with the ability to grow to thirteen as the organisation matures.  The 
main stakeholder constituencies are made up of small-scale miners, individuals 
from support organizations and traders. A further proviso is that no producers or 
traders hold a majority of seats (Cock-Duque 2007: 19). Currently, the BoD is 
made up of two miners, three  researchers/NGOs, and two traders.  
 
In addition to the main Board, an Executive Committee (EC), has been created to 
act on behalf of the Board between meetings on certain issues. This committee is 
made up of three officers who are able to quickly respond to routine or pressing 
issues. As the ARM’s Board is spatially dispersed around the globe, the EC 
arrangement allows for greater manoeuvrability and sustains organisational 
effectiveness, while still preserving the principles of broad based participation.   
 
Stakeholder Alliance 
                                                                                                    
The Stakeholder Alliance (SA) is the broadest instance of ARM’s governance 
structure. It is the primary instrument through which stakeholders committed to 
the mission, values and objectives of ARM are able to participate in the 
organization (ARM d, 2008: online).  The SA is comprised of individuals or 
organisations from any part of the supply chain who want to actively participate in 
the development of ARM. SA members include producers, traders or 
NGO/researchers working towards responsible ASM.  
 
The SA is the forum where strategies, standards and processes are socialized 
within ARM’s network. Being a member of the SA allows participants to nominate 
Board members and recommend individuals for ARM’s Technical Committee. 
Stakeholders are also able to participate in ARM’s meetings and workshops, 
become part of a broader network of experts and organisations working on ASM 
issues, and communicate with stakeholders working on ASM issues via ARM’s 
participation in external networks. (ARM d, 2008: online).  
 
There are also plans to organise the SA along regional lines as ARM expands 
globally15. The primary reasons for this grouping would be to guarantee a bottom 
                                                 
14 Board Members are nominated by members of the Stakeholder Alliance. After consideration by the 
current BoD, they can be elected to become a member of the BoD.  
 
15 ARM is currently using a regionally based model within its Latin American Pilots. The RESPOMIN 
Network is a Latin American knowledge generation platform that brings together regional stakeholders that 
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up approach, minimize costs to participation and build sustainable alliances and 
networks amongst members (Cock-Duque 2007: 23). Regional decisions, 
strategies and/or concerns would be communicated into global decision making 





The Technical Committee (TC) is the instance primarily responsible for setting 
gold production standards. Its purpose is to develop the standards, facilitate 
global consultations and make amendments to the standards based on those 
consultations. The TC is comprised of nine to 15 experts in social, economic, 
environmental, regional or technical aspects of ASM and/or specialists in 
standard setting processes. Members are recommended to the TC for an 
unpaid16 three year term.  
 
Jointly with the Secretariat, the TC collects all the feedback from the 
consultations and makes final decisions on how to make standards most 
applicable to fair trade ASM. From the outset,  the consultations have been 
designed with an emphasis on “a strong bottom-up approach to ensure the 
inclusion of community based groups of small-scale miners, and other key 
players, from mine to retail” (ARM, 2006: 4). Consultations take place via global 
and regional meetings, through on-line dialogue, and local workshops in ASM 
mining communities that are held by ARM’s partners in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia.  
 
 TC’s decisions are generally reached through consensus. However,  if not,  a 
majority vote is the alternative. As members of the TC are regionally dispersed 
and volunteer their time, the TC is able to conduct a substantial amount of its 
work via electronic mediums. For instance, TC members can vote from remote 
stations, via a written submission; meetings can also take place using virtual 
forums, and members participate significantly through email (Cock-Duque, 2007: 
22). This allows ARM to draw upon some of the best expertise on technical 
issues, without the financial or administrative burden of bringing the TC members 




The Executive Director and the Secretariat have the responsibility of running the 
Alliance. “The Executive Director is the Chief Executive, head of the Secretariat 
and Secretary of the Board of Directors” (Cock-Duque, 2007:21). With the 
                                                                                                                                                 
are working towards responsibly mined ASM. RESPOMIN is discussed in more detail in later sections of 
this paper.  
 
16 Members of the technical committee volunteer their time and expertise. Only reasonable expenses of 
participation such as travel costs may be reimbursed to TC members.   
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guidance of the other instances, the Secretariat implements the policies, strategic 
objectives, and co-ordinates the supply chain. Specifically, duties include 
ensuring that the organisation is properly administered, encouraging 
collaboration, fundraising, managing staff and human resources with direction 
from the Board and working with the TC on the standard setting process (Cock-
Duque, 2007: 21). 
 
At this piloting stage, the Secretariat is directly responsible for executing ARM’s 
strategic objectives. Eventually, three units will be staffed to work on the 
advancement of the strategic objectives: standard setting, support to producers 
and communications and advocacy. The Secretariat’s role will then shift to 
supporting and coordinating these units.  
 
This will be especially important as ARM plans to expand with pilots in Africa and 
then in Asia, in order to develop into a global initiative. Intentions for the future 
also include developing and applying certification beyond gold and to other 
precious metals and coloured gemstones (Interview with Cristina Echavarria, 
May 7 2008). Additionally, there has been some preliminary discussion about 
how to accredit the certification system to ensure that ARM products are of a 
high and uniform quality (Cock-Duque, 2007:34).   
 
3.2 Strategic Objectives 
 
The preceding sections have outlined ARM’s history and structures. This section 
will discuss ARM’s strategic objectives, and illustrate the ways in which these are 
being implemented.  
 
In order to develop a traceable and discrete supply of certified fair trade gold 
from artisanal and small scale producers, a three fold approach is being taken to 
(1) develop standards through multi-stakeholder consultations; (2) support 
producer implementation of fair trade standards; and (3) communicate and lobby 
for improved market access and public policies for artisanal and small scale 




In 2005, ARM began its standard setting process. The initial step of this process 
was the identification of a vision for responsible ASM. This was then translated 
into a comprehensive set of draft standards for fair trade gold. Subsequent drafts 
of the standard are going through regional and global consultations and pilots.  
 
A broad vision, and principles, for responsible mining was developed by ARM in 
conjunction with the RESPOMIN knowledge network. This vision was articulated 
at a 2006 RESPOMIN meeting in Quirama, Colombia, and fittingly called the 
‘Vision of Quirama’ (Echavarria, 2008). The development of this vision brought 
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together a multi-stakeholder group of 
primarily Latin American researchers, 
producers, policymakers and practitioners 
in ASM.  RESPOMIN was formed and 
coordinated by ARM with support from 
the Iberoamerican Programme for 
Science and Technology (CYTED). 
 
Subsequently, the Quirama vision and 
other international norms17, with special 
attention to gender equality and 
multiculturalism (ARM a, 2007:5) became 
the guiding principles for the development 
of a holistic set of standards for 
responsible ASM. The standards were 
framed within the fair trade discourse18, and adapted the Fair Trade Labelling 
organisations (FLO) standards to the context of ASM (ARM, 2006: 2).  
 
Consequently, ‘Standard Zero for FairTrade Gold and Associated Metals’ was 
launched in 2006 as a draft set of standards.  Standard Zero was developed by 
the TC, making use of expertise from a wide variety of disciplines19 and regions. 
For this, the Committee also engaged with members from other related and 
ongoing international efforts, such as International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), the Global 
Mercury Project, the Fair Trade Labelling Organisation (FLO) and the World 
Bank’s Communities and Small Scale Mining Secretariat (CASM).  
 
Standard Zero is formulated around five thematic areas; social, economic, labour 
environmental and trading requirements. Within these broad themes there are 
sub-texts that develop the fair trade criteria. For instance, the labour 
                                                 
17 Such as the Millennium Development Goals, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, and ILO conventions on decent work. 
 
18 The fair trade model was chosen because it offers producers market access to niche ethical markets 
where they are able to get a fair price for their commodity, as well as receive a social premium for 
attributes of the product beyond physical aspects such as labour and environmental standards. Furthermore, 
fair trade promotes long-term and sustainable relationships between producers and traders and includes 
access to pre-financing and credit. Finally, the fair trade supply chain provides a platform for connecting 
producers with consumers, and supporting the momentum for trade justice and wider reform of the 
international trading system.   
 
19 The technical committee brought together experts from disciplines such as: certification, organizational 
strengthening of ASM groups, the dignification of labour, occupational health and safety, use of mercury, 
environmental management, gender issues, child labour issues, emergency preparedness and response, 
cleaner production, policy and formalization issues, ecological restoration practices, governance, 
sustainable livelihoods, and market and financial issues (ARM a, 2008:online). 
 
Box 3.2 Vision of Quirama 
 
“ASM is a formalized, organized and 
profitable activity, that uses efficient 
technologies and is socially and 
environmentally responsible; it 
progressively develops within a 
framework of good governance, legality, 
participation and respect for diversity; it 
increases its contribution to the 
generation of decent work, local 
development, poverty reduction and 
social peace in our nations, stimulated 
by a growing consumer demand for 
sustainable minerals and jewellery.” 
(ARM a, 2008: online)  
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development criteria address the prevailing labour rights regime (no forced 
labour, gender equity and abolishment of child labour),  working conditions such 
as health and safety standards, as well as access to social security systems.  
 
In addition, Standard Zero is written with minimum and progressive requirements 
because of an understanding that fair trade is also about building the capacity of 
producers. While the minimum requirements are necessary for fair trade 
certification, progressive requirements have a longer-term vision to empower 
producers and recognise that change is a process.  
 
For instance, Standard Zero’s environmental criteria does not ban the use of 
mercury or cyanide to process the gold, but outlines how they can be managed 
to reduce environmental impacts. The requirement also specifically “seeks to 
promote a gradual decline in the amount of rock that is processed through 
(mercury/cyanide) amalgamation” (ARM a, 2007: 18). A further incentive for 
producers to improve their environmental practices is an “Ecological Premium FT 
ASM Gold,”  over and above the fair trade premium. This is applicable where 
mined gold is mercury and cyanide free (ARM a, 2007: 4.3.1) and where mining 
practices do not permanently alter the local ecology beyond recovery (ARM a, 
2007: 4.3.2).  
 
These elements of Standard Zero make it a dynamic document that is applicable 
to multiple types of small-scale mining operations. It also recognizes that 
producer organisations will build their capacity through sustained engagement 
with the fair trade system. A potential challenge of multiple certification criteria is 
the strain on consumers to understand what quality standards they are buying 
(Renard, 2005:430). Accordingly, ARM will need to develop a clear branding and 
marketing strategy to help consumers understand what the fair trade vs. fair 
trade green labels mean, and the reasons that some operations are able to meet 
both social and green criteria while others do not20.  
 
The current version of Standard Zero (2008) comes out of nine consultative 
workshops that brought together over 800 participants, as well as substantial 
comments from other interested parties. ARM also invited global feedback by 
posting Standard Zero on its website in five languages (English, Spanish, 
French, Portuguese and later Mongolian) as well as distributing it through several 
email list serves (ARM a, 2007: 2). The TC met in Lima, Peru to review 
comments and adapt the standard based on the first phase of public 
consultations (August - December 2006).  
 
                                                 
20 Operations that produce alluvial gold are more likely to  receive a ‘green premium’ in addition to the 
‘fair trade premium’ , given that  alluvial gold can be more easily recovered without the use of mercury and 
cyanide. It is more of a challenge for gold to be mercury and cyanide free when it needs to be separated  
from rocks and other minerals, and when producer associations have to invest more resources to developing 
alternative technologies in order to achieve a green premium.   
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Standard Zero is currently being ground tested at nine sites in Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru,  for a period of 18 months. Along with these pilots, ARM is 
also in the process of developing partnerships in Mongolia, Madagascar, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, in order  to socialize Standard Zero in other 
regions. This is the initial stage of ARM’s long term strategy for Standard Zero to 
become a global benchmark for ASM. In order to actualize this, they are trying to 
identify ASM operations in African and Asia where they may be able to pilot 
Standard Zero, this to determine the applicability of the current standards in 
different regional contexts. Through this process ARM will have to decide on  the 
uniformity or flexibility of the Standard in different regions. This will have to 
include how to handle trade-offs between local and global indicators, so as to 
maintain equity across the regions and clear branding for consumers.  
 
ARM has sought to prepare itself for 
these decisions by developing a 
proactive strategy for a legitimate 
standard development process. ARM 
adheres to the ISEAL code of good 
practices for social and environmental 
standard development. ISEAL on its 
part has recognized ARM’s 
commitment to the “ISEAL Code of 
Good Practices,” and has listed it as a 
‘non member’ compliant organisation 
on their website (ISEAL, 2008: online).  
 
ARM has also experimented with 
methodologies to promote 
participation and break down power 
relations so that miners, academics 
and practitioners are able to sit 
together and debate the visions and 
standards and feel secure that what 
they say will be meaningfully received. 
One strategy that has been used is the 
Reflect-Action tool for adult learning 
for social change. Also, at the 2008 
‘Training of Trainers’ learning forum a 
conflict resolution consultant was 
brought in to workshop, with miners 
and support organisations, 
constructive ways to deal with, and resolve, conflict. These methodologies 
promote mutual learning and build trust between miners, support organisations 
and the ARM Secretariat.   
 
Box 3.3 ISEAL Code of Good Practices  
 
ISEAL is an international non-profit 
organisation founded in 1999. Its primary 
objective is the development and 
“codifi(cation) of best practices for the 
design and implementation of social and 
environmental standards initiatives” (ISEAL 
website, about ISEAL).  
 
The ISEAL’s Code of Good Practice for 
Setting Social and Environmental Standards 
provides a benchmark to assist standard-
setting organizations to improve the process 
in which they develop social and 
environmental standards. 
 
The Code of Good Practices was developed 
through a multi-stakeholder consultation 
process, itself a central element of ISEAL’s 
approach to developing standards. It 
outlines procedures for the development of 
credible standards that address issues such 
as the scope and effectiveness of 
standards, methods for meaningful 
participation in standards development, and 
the process of harmonizing standards with 
other initiatives so that they are widely 
applicable. 
 





Currently, ARM is working towards finding a third party certifier to verify 
compliance with Standard Zero. One potential option that is being explored is to 
work with pre-existing certifiers,  such as the FairTrade labelling organizations, 
and use their FLO-cert division. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between ARM and FLO in 2007 to further explore this relationship (ARM-FTF-
FLO, 2007).  In lieu of developing a partnership with FLO, ARM is also looking 
into alternative organisations who have the capacity to act as third party verifiers 
(Interview with Cristina Echavarria, May 7 2008).  
 
ARM has also developed a brand, ‘FairMined’,  specifically for responsibly mined 
jewellery. This logo will either be co-branded with an existing brand such as the 
FLO logo, or be developed as a stand alone trademark.  In January 2009, ARM 
and FLO reiterated their commitment to work together to develop a 
comprehensive certification system for responsible ASM gold (FLO and ARM, 
2009). It is expected that fairly traded, FairMined certified gold will become 
available in the market in 2010.  
 
Producer Support  
Supporting community based small 
scale artisanal miners is a principle that 
is central and entrenched in ARM’s 
mandate. A primary requisite for 
implementing Standard Zero is that 
small-scale and artisanal miners’ 
associations must ‘demonstrate a 
partnership with a support organisation 
(NGO, government agency or 
academia) that will ensure the technical 
quality of the evaluation of Standard 
Zero and the application of a 
participatory approach based on learning by doing” (ARM a, 2008:online).  The 
emphasis put on ‘participation and learning by doing’ reflects the progressive 
nature of the standard. In ARM, participatory learning occurs within a specific 
mining operation, between miners and support organisations, horizontally 
between pilot projects and throughout the ARM network as a whole.  
 
Linking producers and support organisations has been one way in which ARM 
has institutionalised learning within producer organisations. This mandated 
relationship (a requirement of Standard Zero) is seen as a necessary prerequisite 
for adapting ASM operations to a fair trade threshold.  Oftentimes the support 
organisation has a history of working with the producer organisation prior to 
becoming part of the ARM network. In some cases, the producer/producer 
support relationship has had to be created; this was the case with the Bella Rica 
cooperative in Ecuador. When Bella Rica expressed an interest in becoming a 
Standard Zero pilot, ARM drew upon its network of NGOs working in ASM and 
identified the academic organisation Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral 
Box 3.4 ARMs Vision for Communities  
 
A long-term objective for ARM is to 
leverage its formalization of producer 
organisations for broader community 
development.  
 
Eventually, ARM seeks to incorporate the 
informal groups and producer family units 
who provide associated services within the 
same village into the fair trade scheme to 
generate improved quality of life for 




(ESPOL) to work with Bella Rica on standard testing and application. ESPOL has 
been very important in facilitating this process, specifically in testing the toolkits 
and giving systematic feedback to the network. However, it is essential that the 
miners and cooperatives be confident with the fair trade gold project, and that 
they be convinced that, for them,  this is a good economic and social opportunity. 
 
Along with the direct 
capacity building 
relationship between 
support and producers’ 
organisations, a number 
of toolkits have been 
developed to assist 
producer organisations 
with implementing 
Standard Zero. The three 
toolkits in use to date are: 
the baseline toolkit, the 
cost of production toolkit 
and the quality 
management system and 
traceability toolkit (ARM b, 
2007).  
 
The Baseline toolkit was 
developed to act as a 
reference for producer 
organisations as they 
implement Standard Zero. 
It aims to help 
organisations gain a 
greater understanding of 
what they have achieved 
and the challenges that 
remain in order to reach 
the level of fair trade. The 
Baseline tool also enables 
pilot projects to monitor 
progress from a starting 
point in their institutional 
development. 
 
Similarly, the Cost of Production toolkit helps miners learn more about business 
operations and management. It allows them to disaggregate revenues and 
expenditures and helps the miners gain a day to day understanding of their 
operations. The intention is that they can be more empowered to plan future 
Box 3.5 Regional Consultations and Training  
 
The Second Regional Workshop on Standard Zero was 
held in Peru from April 23rd to 30th 2008. This event was 
primarily to get feedback on Standard Zero and toolkit 
effectiveness.  
 
Several pilots reported that the toolkit helped to organise 
information, in some cases already known, but not 
documented. The toolkits also provided an opportunity to 
learn new information. For instance, one pilot reported that 
baseline tools revealed much social division in the 
operations in terms of age, gender and inequalities in the 
division of responsibilities (AURELSA). This information 
was already known to some, but broader awareness was 
raised through these processes.  
 
In some cases the methodology had to be adjusted to 
better capture necessary information. Pilots reported cross 
referencing with government records, bringing on 
anthropological, environmental or other technical experts, 
or working with groups of miners and special informants, 
rather than relying solely on local individuals to gather the 
information (ARM Workshop: Day 1: April 23 2008).   
 
Some important feedback on the toolkits included:  
 
-complexity of the methodology, including the length of 
document and technical language; 
 
-need to work with technical experts to complete some of 
the requirements; and 
 
-confidentiality of information being released by miners 
(especially for cost of production). 
 
Two working groups were created to address this feedback 
on Baseline and Cost of Production toolkits.  
 
Furthermore, a first training session was held on the QMS 
toolkit by leadership of COV who developed the toolkit.  
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growth and expansion, given a clear understanding of their present conditions 
(ARM Workshop: DAY 1: April 23 2008).  
 
Lastly, the Quality Management System and Traceability toolkit (QMS) develops 
an internal process for reflections on fair trade quality systems and is a self-
assessment tool for the producer organization. The QMS is made up of three 
manuals: A Manual of Procedures to record routine processes; a Manual of 
Quality Assurance to build internal accountability; and, a Manual of Formats to 
standardize documentation and processes and ensure the full traceability of the 
metal.  
 
Lina Villa, executive director of AMICHOCO and a developer of the QMS toolkit, 
reflects on COV experiences with internal quality management systems. The 
QMS ‘provides mechanisms for accountability, governance, development of 
procedures and building internal controls … it helps to create  maturity in 
organisations because it lessens reliance on a few individual members through 
the institutionalization of processes’ (ARM Workshop, DAY 2: April 24 2008). In 
her opinion, the QMS tool has normalized third party verification because fair 
trade standards are primarily conducted internally by the producer organisation 
itself, with third party verification serving only as a further level of accountability 
and quality assurance for consumers.    
 
Communication and Advocacy 
 
ARM’s third objective is to co-ordinate the fair trade supply chain of ASM gold 
and advocate for further growth in this sector. This role includes facilitating 
communications inside and outside the network to identify opportunities and build 
partnerships, share information and innovations, and participate in the global 
discourse around ASM.  This advocacy component has been integrated into 
ARM’s strategy in order to support the formalization and legalization of ASM, and 
participate in the creation of a global enabling environment which is necessary 
for the scaling-up of this movement.    
 
In order to meet this objective, ARM actively participates in global forums such as 
CASM and Madison Dialogues to coordinate an ASM development strategy and 
commercialization strategy respectively. It works with governments, businesses, 
industry associations and NGOs in different regions where pilot projects are 
currently operating, or in regions where it is planning to expand.  
 
Of special interest are the public policies that guide ASM in many developing 
countries. Oftentimes policies are written for large industrial mining concerns and 
are not suited to smaller mining operations, and in some countries, ASM is even 
an illegal activity (Interview with Laura Barretto, April 3 2008). In line with 
Standard Zero, gold must be sourced from a legal mining concession in order to 
be certified “fair trade” (ARM a, 2007: A10). This is one of the main incentives for 




To date, ARM has mainly engaged with 
governments individually rather than 
with their regional and global fora. This 
makes it difficult to create universalized 
definitions or policies for ASM in the 
countries where ARM operates. Even in 
the Latin American piloting countries, 
there is a wide range of policies towards 
ASM. For instance, Peru has an 
artisanal mining law and already miners 
and NGOs are working to improve upon 
it (Meeting at the Congress of Peru, 
Lima, Peru: April 25 2008), whereas in 
neighbouring Colombia the government 
continues to see ASM as a hassle or 
problem that needs to be eliminated; it 
channels more of its energy towards 
attracting large scale multinationals 
(Interview with Nicholas Lopez, May 16 
2008).   
 
Thus, the public policy environment is one of the most challenging objectives for 
ARM (Interviews with Laura Baretto April 3 2008, Cristina Echavarria May 7 
2008, and Catalina Cock-Duque May 9 2008). Perhaps this is because it requires 
the Alliance to engage with governments who hold an adverse view of ASM; 
much effort is needed to make them see the developmental opportunities of 
ASM, and then convince them to develop policies that support a formalization of 
the ASM sector.  
 
There is also an opportunity for Standard Zero and the piloting experiences to 
build national and regional governments’ capacity. The processes that pilots 
have developed to implement Standard Zero can possibly be used as a point of 
reference for governments,  as these try to define the scope of ASM and develop 
viable policies to govern it. This is because Standard Zero engages with many of 
the technical, economic, environmental and social aspects for sustainable 
artisanal mining. Governments can potentially learn from, and engage in an 
iterative process with ARM, so as to transform ASM into an opportunity for 
poverty alleviation and national development (Interview with Julia Cuadros April 
21 2008). Through this type of dialogue ARM’s initiative can have broader 
outreach, beyond  those producers’ organisations with which it directly works to 
certify gold fair trade21 (Interview with Laura Barretto April 3 2008).  ARM  
recognizes that its work can be supported by progressive government policies; it 
                                                 
21 Cristina Echavarria, Secretary General of ARM spoke publically at the Peruvian Congress about ARM’s 
aspirations to have a wider influence on public policy and ASM than the Associations direct stakeholders 
(Echavarria, Congress of Peru, April 25 2008).  
Box 3.6 Engaging with Policy Makers  
 
ARM is engaging with governments, and 
illustrating through their pilots, the 
developmental opportunities that can be 
reaped from legalized and organized 
small scale mining. For instance, in 
conjunction with the Peru meetings at the 
end of April, all the delegates attended a 
public meeting at the Peruvian National 
Congress to discuss national legislation 
around ASM. Presentations were made 
by several of the pilot projects about their 
experiences in formalizing their 
operations to gain fair trade certification. 
Specialists in public mining policy, and the 
commercialization of gold also made 
presentations to the congressmen. This 
was a televised meeting that was 
broadcast on the national legislative 
channel and to all the politicians’ offices in 
the Peruvian Congress.  
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therefore defers to national legislation whenever this sets requirements that are 
more demanding than those of  Standard Zero on particular issues  (Standard 
Zero, 2007: A16).  
 
On the commodity distribution front, ARM is coordinating the development of 
systems and procedures to trace the gold from mine to retail. This includes 
creating traceable refining capacity, developing partnerships with distributors and 
formulating a branding and marketing strategy. One of ARM’s key partners in this 
process is the UK based Ethical Bullion Company (EBC), created to operate as 
the refining and distribution channel for Standard Zero certified gold.  
Negotiations are currently ongoing to establish formal ties between EBC, ARM 
and producer associations (ARM and EBC, 2008). Producers do not have to 
channel their gold through the EBC interface to be fair trade certified (Interview 
with Patrick Schein, April 14 2008). Still, there are some clear incentives for 
miners to work with the EBC. These include the channelling of a percentage of 
profits from the sale of gold back to producer associations and their communities, 
so as to create a long-term source of development finance (ARM and EBC, 2008; 
Interview with Greg Valerio, April 10 2008; interview with Cristina Echavarria, 
May 7 2008). This model innovates with regard to corporate decision making, as 
it ensures that the EBC honours the miners’ values  and their vision for 
responsibly produced jewellery.  
 
Currently, pilot projects are beginning to test the EBC by channelling some of the 
gold produced through its refinery in Paris and its distribution house in London. 
The Sotrami cooperative, one of three Peruvian pilots, recently sent 1.2 kg of 
gold through the EBC channel. Similarly, the Nariño pilot in Colombia has also 
been sending small shipments of gold through the EBC. They initially sent 1 kg of 
gold, and are progressively sending larger shipments of up to 3kgs, as their 
confidence in this refiner/distributor improves (Interview with Greg Valerio April 
10 2008; interview with Cristina Echavarria August 1 2008).  
 
Through the development of the EBC, ARM is also attempting to transcend the 
20th century model of the NGO that  fully depends on donors to create alternative 
sources of income, in order  to finance the coordinating secretariat and increase 
the economic gains accruing to miners and their communities. While the 
Secretariat and pilots currently depend on donor funding, a future ambition is to 
move toward a social entrepreneurship model (Reis 1999) that uses the ‘ethical’ 
markets to solve social problems and provide financial sustainability to the 
Secretariat in order to multiply the movement.  
 
3.3 Generating, Coordinating and Building upon Knowledge  
 
ARM has drawn upon a diverse range of knowledge generating platforms to 
support its institutional growth at local, regional and global levels. Some of the 
knowledge networks are from stakeholders within the Alliance, and others are 
with external actors. In order to illustrate ARM’s philosophy of knowledge this 
29 
 
section will discuss the multiples ways in which learning is being fostered in ARM 
through internal and external knowledge platforms. 
  
Internal Knowledge Platforms 
 
ARM’s Secretariat is critical for communications, coordination and networking  
within the Alliance. It facilitates multiple information flows that support peer-
learning between producer organisations and the transfer of knowledge and 
information between producers and traders. The Secretariat also has the primary 
responsibility of engaging with external networks to share ARM’s experiences 
and strategies, as well as integrate knowledge from other initiatives into its 
learning systems.  
 
The harnessing of technology to reduce 
physical distances has been used to 
foster strong communications, 
disseminate and store information, and 
coordinate strategies. Members of the 
ARM network extensively use email, 
Skype, and teleconferencing technology 
to communicate. ARM also has a very 
active website,  where members of the 
Alliance can access documents and 
communicate with internal and external 
colleagues via the newsfeed.   
 
One practical example of how ARM is 
innovating to bridge the knowledge gap 
is by distributing to every participant, at 
the end of its workshops, CD roms  
containing  all of the workshop’s  
presentations. This is an efficient and 
inexpensive way of ensuring that 
knowledge is physically shared between 
participants, and becomes part of their 
reference bank. It also supports the 
institutional memory of the organisation 
by recording and documenting the 
multiple stages of development, as new 
knowledge is introduced into the Alliance. 
 
However, it has been noted that building and sustaining relationships solely 
through virtual contacts is challenging (Diani, 2000). Thus, ARM has tried to 
create opportunities for stakeholders to meet, exchange experiences and build 
trust. One way that they have done this is through opportunities for horizontal 
knowledge exchange between producer organisations. A particular example was 
Box 3.7 Encouraging Peer-Learning  
 
One apparent example of peer learning 
was at the Aurelsa pilot project in the Sur 
Medio region of Peru. Since 1986, Aurelsa 
has gone from an informal and illicit 
operation to a highly formalized 
cooperative that owns the mining 
concession where they operate, conduct 
geological surveys, and has developed 
water and environmental management 
strategies1.  
 
Aurelsa has also hired engineers to 
professionalize their operations by 
surveying the land, organising human 
resources, and taking responsibility for 
occupational health and safety. 
 
Producer associations from other 
operations appeared to be very impressed 
by this approach of contracting engineers 
to develop the potential of the mining 
operations. During the field visit, there was 
a substantial question period between 
members of the visiting producer 
organisations and the engineers and 
management of Aurelsa about the value-
added of this expertise (author’s 
observations).   
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at the April 2008 ‘Training of Trainers’ meetings in Peru, participants traveled to 
the three Peruvian pilot projects in the Sur Medio region of the country22. This 
was an opportunity for producer and support organisations to learn from the 
experiences of other pilot projects. This learning tour included visiting the mine 
shafts, processing plants, woman miners’ recovery and sorting operations. The 
field trip was an opportunity to visit surrounding communities and exchange ideas 
regarding technical and administrative aspects of mining operations. It 
encouraged discussions and networking between producer associations. 
Successive tours are being planned to visit other pilot sites in order to reciprocate 
occasions for peer-learning.  
 
An additional approach for knowledge generation and exchange within the ARM 
network has been to involve a number of ‘in house’ specialists and experts into 
the different instances of the organisations’ governance. Along with the Technical 
Committee (previously mentioned),  ARM has a public policy specialist who sits 
on the Board of Directors; a technical and environmental specialist who is a 
member of the Stakeholder Alliance and Technical Committee; and people who 
have extensive knowledge in trading, refining and distributing gold on the 
Stakeholder Alliance, Technical Committee and Board of Directors. The 
Executive Director is also very experienced in community development and in 
conducting/administering social research in participatory natural resource 
management. These skills have enabled the coordination of knowledge flows to 
develop actionable outcomes from this information.  
 
While these examples do not account for the full range of expertise that ARM 
draws upon, they illustrate the ways in which ARM is creating internal knowledge 
networks to build its capacity to innovate. This internalisation of knowledge 
allows producers associations to learn amongst each other, and have 
unprecedented access to highly skilled people who share their expertise with 
miners and their communities.  These strong internal processes of knowledge 
management also have the potential to increase the profile and legitimacy of the 
organisation amongst other national, regional and international players:  ARM’s 











                                                 





Box 3.8 Regional Knowledge Networks  
 
The RESPOMIN network was established in 2005 
to bring participants from Latin America together 
for seminars, exchanges and courses, as well as to 
publish on their work. It is comprised of 
approximately 30 researchers, NGOs and mining 
leaders.  
 
To date, major achievements have been the 
development of the ‘Vision of Quirama’ which 
underpins the Standard Zero development 
process. RESPOMIN has also recently published 
“La Rama Dorada” translated as “The Golden 
Vein”, which is a guide for responsible ASM 
(RESPOMIN, 2008).  
 
Initially, RESPOMIN received two years of funding 
from the Ibero-American Program of Science and 
Technology for Development (CYTED). Reflecting 
the enduring value of the network to its 
participants, this has remained operational (mainly 
by email and other ICT’s) even though CYTED 
funding ended in 2007 (Interview with Olma 
Alvarez and Robert Dover, May 19 2008).  
External Knowledge Platforms  
 
ARM is also an active member of 
external and/or peripheral 
networks for information 
exchange and capacity building.  
In some cases, it has worked with 
external networks to create 
synergies between organisational 
objectives, and at other times it 
has built upon the work done by 
previous knowledge and capacity 
building initiatives, particularly in 
the pilot regions. This section will 
outline several instances of how 
ARM has interfaced with other 
external networks to support their 
organisational objectives.  
 
RESPOMIN (the Network for 
Responsible Mining) is the most 
closely allied knowledge network 
to ARM, and has a set of strategic 
objectives that seek to support 
ARM’s mandate to create a 
certification system for ASM. RESPOMIN was founded in 2005 by ARM’s 
leadership and strategic partners as a potential solution to generate a 
participatory set of principles for responsible ASM23. RESPOMIN’s seeks to be a 
collaborative research “(n)etwork for the exchange of knowledge, experiences, 
technologies and processes related with artisanal and small-scale mining,” (ARM 
a, 2008: online).  
 
The Communities and Small-Scale Mining Secretariat (CASM) has been 
mentioned several times throughout this study. The ARM Secretariat has 
acknowledged that CASM ‘plays a significant knowledge sharing and 
dissemination networking role for ARM’ (Interview with Cristina Echavarria, May 
7 2008) and thus they have participated in all CASM annual meetings since their 
inception. In 2005, the meeting helped them to gain institutional legitimacy 
amongst peers to begin to formulate Standard Zero (Ibid). They have also been 
given opportunities to workshop Standard Zero at the 2006 Madagascar and 
2007 Mongolia events. The ARM Secretariat also jointly organised the 2007 
                                                 
23 ARM, in alliance with the INER Institute of the University of Antioquia (Colombia) and the Amigos del 





Box 3.9 The Ashoka Organisation  
 
In lieu of trying to assess Ashoka’s 
impact on Ms. Catalina Cock-
Duque, and subsequently on ARM, 
this study will present some findings 
from Ashoka’s self evaluation that 
seeks to measure the effectiveness 
of their investment in fellows.  
 
Ashoka found that after 10 years of 
being a fellow, 66% were leaders in 
their fields and 71% of fellows’ 
ideas have been inline with national 
government policy shifts. Their 
evaluation also attempted to 
quantify Ashoka’s impact on the 
Fellows’ overall success, and 
determined it as having a 56% 
impact on Fellows’ achievements 
(Ashoka c, 2008: online).  
‘Ethical Jewellery Summit’ with CASM and others24, and is a contributor to the 
‘CASM Communiqué”, a recently established (June 2008) monthly publication 
that reports on global activities in the ASM sector.  
 
The current president of the Regional Association of Artisanal Miners (AMASUC 
Latin America) expressed that CASM has provided a forum for organisations 
working toward developmental ASM to exchange experiences, and that CASM 
meetings are often significant opportunities for networking (Interview with Manuel 
Reinoso Rivas,  April 25 2008).  For instance, he recalls making contact with the 
current Executive Director of ARM at the 2002 CASM meeting, and today, he is a 
member of ARM’s Board of Directors and a leader within the Alliance.  
 
Other key individuals have strengthened 
ARM’s capacity by bringing their personal 
networks to support the Alliance’s institutional 
growth and capacity. For instance, Ashoka, 
an organisation that supports social 
entrepreneurs, elected Ms. Catalina Cock-
Duque (Founder and Chairperson of ARM) an 
Ashoka Fellow. This lifetime fellowship aims 
to invest in outstanding social entrepreneurs 
and “helps them to achieve maximum social 
impact” (Ashoka a, 2008: online). Ashoka’s 
threefold strategy is to support individual 
social entrepreneurs, create a forum for 
social entrepreneurs to work together and 
collaborate, and to give them the access to a 
network of business and academic 
consultants for advisory and strategising 
services (Interview with Sarah Berghorst, 
May 21 2008).  
 
In several instances, Catalina has used Ashoka’s network to support ARM’s 
development. One clear example is that ARM’s branding strategy, FairMined, 
was developed by marketing professionals who are part of Ashoka’s strategic 
partners25 and work on a pro-bono basis to support Ashoka social entrepreneurs 
(Interview with Catalina Cock-Duque, May 9 2008). She has also used her 
fellowship to consult with global business leaders on a potential structure for 
                                                 
24 The Ethical Jewellery Summit took place on October 25th and 26th 2007 at the World Bank/CASM 
headquarters in Washington D.C. It was organised by ARM, CASM, De Beers, Earthworks, Ethical Metal 
Smiths, Fair Trade Labelling Organisation, Partnership Africa Canada, Jewellers of America, Rapaport 
Group. The Summit was supported by various large scale mining multi-nationals and international 
jewellers.  
 
25 Ashoka has forged strategic partnerships with leading global companies, to provide management, 




ARM’s partnership with the Ethical Bullion Company (Ibid). The impact of 
Ashoka’s support on these two issues still has to be fully determined because 
ARM has not yet begun to commercialise certified gold; ARM is still negotiating 
with EBC to define its stake in the company. Nevertheless, Ashoka has enabled 
ARM to learn and strategize with a cohort of leading consultancy agencies and 
business leaders; these have (at the least) shown commitment toward 
transferring   business and financial skills to the social sector.   
 
This research has also identified examples of how ARM’s work has built upon the 
foundations laid by previous efforts. Two examples of how capacity building 
projects have enabled ARM to innovate with alternative trade structures will be 
presented. Both these projects sought to empower producer organisations with  
sustainable and developmental mining practices, and assist them with  
developing  their operations. 
 
Project Gama (Gestión Ambiental en la Minería Artesanal) was started in 1999 to  
improve the environmental conditions and support the sustainable development 
of the Sur Medio region of Peru26. The project broadly focused on the 
formalisation of artisanal mining, and worked on four themes: technical-
environmental, health-environmental, social-economic, and legal issues (Gama, 
2008: online). Gama is a three phase project, which  concluded in 200827. Along 
with work in the pilot regions, another project output is a web-based knowledge 
portal with real-time information about the gold market, a document library, a 
database of institutions working on ASM and links to other initiatives (including 
ARM and CASM).  
 
The project co-ordinators of Gama, who were known to ARM’s leaders, identified 
and recommended to ARM the three current Peruvian pilot projects (Interview 
with Felix Hrushka, April 28 2008). By that time these pilots had achieved 
significant progress towards formalisation (e.g.: a legal concession, an active 
producer’s association, environmental management, health and safety policies, 
and other economic and social indicators necessary to participate in the 
certification scheme).  
 
It is unlikely that these achievements could have been made possible without the 
capacity building of Gama and other development programs. Furthermore, Gama 
had developed a significant amount of data and contextual information that it has 
shared with ARM on mining operations, mineral processing techniques and 
surrounding communities (Interview with Felix Hrushka, April 28 2008). As Gama 
was in its final stage, its leadership worked to support ARM’s initiative by 
providing technical advice an administrative support (in Peru), and by helping 
                                                 
26 Project Gama worked with artisanal miners in the departments of Fist, Arequipa, Ayacucho and Ica, 
Peru.  
 
27 Project Gama was financed by Swiss Co-operation, and managed by a local team and an international 
consultant based in Lima.  
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miners to seize new opportunities for long-term economic gains and 
developmental outcomes through fair trade certification.  
 
A second example of how ARM’s work has been facilitated in part by the work of 
a previous capacity building initiative is provided by the ILO’s International 
Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). Among other regions, IPEC 
worked in the Sur Medio region of Peru on a project that addressed the social, 
technical, production and environmental problems of traditional gold mining 
methods (Martinez-Castilla, 2000). This project compiled a range of statistical 
and qualitative information and provided a baseline of data for the region 
(Martinez-Castilla, 2000). The ILO-IPEC program also made investments into 
technification of mining operations, and worked to improve social conditions.  
 
Particularly for ARM, the ILO/IPEC worked with the producer organisation 
Sotrami, the association of women miners, and the corresponding village, Santa 
Filomena, who are currently piloting Standard Zero. One concrete example of 
how IPEC’s work supported ARM is through the installation of mineral processing 
facilities to separate the gold from other minerals, instead of using Quimbaletes, 
a traditional Inca technology that is primarily operated by children28  (Interview 
with Felix Hrushka, April 27 2008). Subsequently, Sotrami also invested in a 
more efficient technology, cyanidation agitation tanks, which reduces processing 
times from one month (ILO technology) to one day.  
 
According to Cooperaccion, a Peruvian NGO working with the ILO on the 
national implementation of the project, funding and political support for this type 
of project could be mobilized primarily because the project was framed in terms 
of children (Interview with Julia Cuadros, April 21 2008).  Moreover, according to 
project implementers, the initiative brought various levels of government, large 
scale mining companies, small-scale miners and communities to the table under 
the theme of elimination of child labour; however the project outputs had broader 
implications and helped to push the ASM agenda generally forward in Peru (Ibid).   
 
The work of the ILO-IPEC project is a further example of how ARM has built 
upon the capacity of previous investments in ASM producer organisations and 
communities. The experience of the ILO project created a baseline of information 
on the communities of Santa Filomena and on the Sotrami operations that ARM 
has been able to refer to, when implementing its baseline toolkit. Furthermore, 
the ILO project invested in sustainable technologies, and created opportunities 
for the mining communities to understand the benefits of technology – which has 
led to further self-funded investments in mineral processing techniques.  
 
                                                 
28 Quimbaletes are a see-saw like device that mills the rock and separates the gold through mercury 
amalgamation. Children often work the quimbaletes because of their size, and because it is relatively easy 
and ‘fun’ work. In addition to the opportunity cost of forgoing education to work the quimbaletes, children 
are also highly exposed to mercury (liquid and vapour) through this type of work.  
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As a result, Sotrami has built up enough capacity to participate as an ARM pilot, 
and benefit from additional producer support and learning opportunities created 
by ARM. This capacity building has also been translated into horizontal learning 
opportunities by other ASM producer organisations within the ARM network - 
outlined in the previous section on internal knowledge platforms. It has been an 
example of successful ASM operations that support the Peruvian Government’s 
case for reforming the mining code into one that would be more applicable to 
small-scale mining activities.  
 
Summing up, there is a fairly good chance that certified gold will be produced by 
ARM’s Latin American pilots in the upcoming year. A substantial part of this 
success is due to the efforts of producer organisations, support organisations 
and international cooperation programs that worked with artisanal mining 
communities prior to the ARM project (Echavarria, 2007: 5). Through this period 
of incubation and piloting, ARM has been able to develop a well designed system 
of governance that encourages it to be a learning organisation. It has also been 
able to blend together traditional knowledge with professional skills to develop a 
set of standards applicable to ASM. Capacity for this has been enabled through 
the Secretariat, which coordinates the functions of the organization’s other 
instances and implements its strategic objectives. Thus, ARM’s progress to date 
has put it in a fairly good position to implement the standards in the Latin 
American context.  
‘ 
For ARM to reach its aspirations of certifying ASM miners globally, it will need to 
continue to identify committed producer and support organisations that have the 
capacity to test the standards and adapt these to different regional contexts. For 
this, ARM must also work to develop corresponding knowledge networks in these 
regions (similar to their work with RESPOMIN). Finally, it will be important for 
ARM to continue to engage with transnational networks in an effort to create an 





The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an international effort to 
eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. Established in 2003, the KPCS is an 
intergovernmental regime to which so far 49 member countries have adhered 
that are engaged in diamond producing, cutting, polishing, and retailing.29 It uses 
a process of monitoring and certification to track rough diamonds as they travel 
along the production-supply chain,  in an effort to ensure that revenues from their 
sale are not channelled towards conflict.  
 
The issue of conflict diamonds 
came to international attention 
as a result of significant 
campaigning by global civil 
society organizations (CSOs). 
Civil society raised the profile 
of ‘blood diamonds’ through the 
threat of consumer 
mobilization. This activism 
endangered the romantic 
branding of diamonds and put 
pressure upon the industry and 
nations involved in the industry 
to confront the issue of the 
conflict trade. This 
mainstreaming of conflict diamonds prompted the industry to mitigate risk by 
taking a coordinated and concerted position.  
 
In 2000, the industry established the World Diamond Council with a mandate to 
work towards “the development, implementation and oversight of a tracking 
system for the export and import of rough diamonds to prevent the exploitation of 
diamonds for illicit purposes such as war and inhumane acts” (WDC, 2008). The 
WDC coordinates the implementation of the KPCS through industrial 
stakeholders such as cutters, polishers and retailers. The WDC has also 
developed a voluntary set of CSR principles to guide industries’ compliance of 
the process.   
 
The ‘US War on Terror’ was another driver as it linked diamond trading with 
terrorism30. When the US passed the Clean Diamond Act of 2003, the KPCS was 
legitimized because this Act requires that diamonds entering the US market be 
tracked and certified (Tamm, 2004:690). As the US accounts for over 50% of 
                                                 
29 The European Union is constituted as one member. 
30 Please see: US House Congressional Record (H8386). November 27, 2001.  
Box 4.1 Civil Society Propels Global Governance 
 
Efforts were made by Global Witness, Partnership 
Africa Canada and Fatal Transactions among others 
to inform consumers and mobilize industry about the 
role of diamonds in financing conflict in West and 
Central Africa (site). In 1999, Global Witness 
published ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies 
and Governments in the Angolan Conflict”. This was 
the first of many exposés that revealed linkages 
between the legitimate diamond trade and civil 
conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC, and 
more recently in Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. Côte 
d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe have both been noted in the 
2008 Kimberley Process Communiqué  released after 
the India Plenary. 
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global diamond retail sales, this was a major propeller for the establishment of 
the Kimberley Process (Interview with Ian Smillie, Jan 23 2008).  
 
Six years on, the KPCS has become a 
working piece of global governance – 
and the only legitimate channel for the 
international trade of rough diamonds. 
At the global level, the Kimberley 
Process has been structured with an 
annual rotating chair amongst 
members, who also acts as the 
secretariat for their term. There are 
also seven working groups and 
committees that provide the 
institutional structure of the process. 
While the KP has been negotiated and 
monitored at the international level; it 
is also implemented at the national level by governments who are required to 
meet a number of minimum requirements to remain in good standing.  
 
Thus, this examination of the KPCS will take place in both these jurisdictions to 
reflect the way that the process has been organized.  Along with an examination 
of the global governance, a national case study of the Sierra Leonean context will 
try to show how post-conflict countries are implementing the KP, and perhaps 
use it as a spring board for development.  
 
4.1 Multi-Stakeholder and Multi-Tiered Governance 
 
The Kimberley Process has moved beyond usual processes of international trade 
policy negotiations towards a multi-stakeholder governance structure. 
Traditionally, trade has been negotiated between national governments31 and 
industry and civil society have had to find alternative ways of influencing these 
international processes.  
                                                 
31 For instance, see the structure and negotiation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and  the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) 
 
Box 4.2 Implementing KPCS In-Country 
 
The main elements of the Kimberley 
Process at the national level are the 
establishment of relevant laws, regulations 
and internal controls to meet the minimum 
requirements. An import/export authority 
must also be designated to officiate KP 
certificates and ensure that diamonds are 
transported in secure and tamper resistant 
containers, and lastly production, import and 
export statistics data must be submitted. 
The KP also works under a principle of 
cooperation and transparency between 
participants (KPCS, 2003).  
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Box 4.3 Global Configuration of the Kimberley Process  
 
On an annual rotational basis, the KP is chaired by national 
member states. The Chair is responsible for coordinating 
communication within and outside the KP process. Their 
duties also extend to hosting the annual plenary and 
intersession meetings, as well as maintaining the website. 
The chair also works closely with the working groups to 
ensure compliance of members. 
 
The Working Groups (WG) of the Kimberley Process is the 
arena where most of the capacity building and 
implementation for the process occurs. 
 
Currently, there are WGs that coordinate Monitoring, 
Diamond Experts*, Statistics and Artisanal/Alluvial 
Producers. Committees have also been established to 
manage Rules and Procedures, Participation, Selection of 
Leadership and Technical Assistance.  
 
Membership to these working groups and committees 
depends on the willingness to participate (Interview with 
Stephan Chardon, August 7th 2008). They are open to 
member states, industry and civil society. 
 
The Working Groups house a substantial proportion of the 
institutional memory of the KP because their leadership 
does not have a fixed term – unlike the secretariat which 
rotates on an annual basis.  In the future, it may be prudent 
for the KP to develop a formal process to pass along 
leadership of the WGs to ensure their longevity of these 
institutions.  
 
*Diamond expert WGs develop methodologies to increase 
capacity to value and track diamonds.  
Through its tripartite 
structure, the Kimberley 
Process has gone a long 
way toward recognizing 
the role that civil society 
and industry must play, 
in order for the regime to 
be implemented 
successfully. Although 
civil society and industry 
are only observer 
members in the process, 
they are able to 
participate in the annual 
plenary and inter-
sessional meetings, to 
participate (and lead) 
some working groups. 
Key actors from these 
sectors have also been 
given full access to 
KPCS documentation, 
statistics and monitoring 
reports32. This level of 
transparency (or at least 
reduced opacity) of 
international trade 
negotiation processes is 
one of the most 
important innovations of 
the KPCS. 
 
The institutionalization of multi-stakeholder participation is a significant 
advancement of governance for globalized trade networks. The Kimberley 
Process, however, still faces inequalities because participation in the Process is 
completely self-financed. This means that, if CSOs (and even some countries) do 
not have the funds needed to defray their participation, they must either raise 
these, or be less active. To date, this challenge has tended to be solved by 
developed countries financing developing country delegations (Interview with 
Stephan Chardon, August 7 2008), and global CSOs financing the participation 
of national organisations (Interview with Ian Smillie, Jan 23 2008; interview with 
Abu Brima, Sept 16 2008).  
 
                                                 
32 While the KPCS does release some statistical and monitoring data of member participants, a substantial 
amount of the data needed to effectively implement the process can only be accessed by member countries 
and certain civil society and industry organisations.  
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Civil society is taking the lead in addressing this design challenge. They are 
calling for the establishment of a sustainable source of finance that can be used 
by developing world NGOs to participate in the meetings, monitoring visits and 
the training sessions. Consequently, a coalition of CSOs held a meeting that 
coincided with the Brussels Plenary in 2007 to address the issue of meaningful 
civil society participation within the global and national processes. From these 
discussions, a civil society participation fund is being set up as a longer term 
solution to this problem – and a few national governments and industry members 
have agreed to contribute to it. Nevertheless, this extra finance does not reduce 
a donor/recipient relationship nor does it restructure financial or other resource 
inequalities within the process. For this reason, civil society continues to call 
upon the KPCS to develop internal financing mechanisms for participation 
(Interview with Anneke Galama, June 11 2008)  
 
The participation of some countries in the Kimberley Process also reflects 
inequalities similar to those faced by civil society vis-à-vis other stakeholders. A 
central element of this is the dichotomy between choice to participate and 
capacity to participate. For instance, West and Central African countries 
producing alluvial diamonds did not have a choice but to participate in the 
Kimberley Process33 if they wanted to access international markets (Interview 
with Abu Brima, Sept 16 2008; interview with Usman Boie-Kamara, Sept 18 
2008). Yet, the extent to which these same countries can engage in the Process 
is limited by their financial capacities. As one’s participation depends on one’s 
ability to finance it, poorer countries may choose to participate in the Plenary only 
and not in the Inter-sessional (as in the Sierra Leonean case until 2008) or else, 
refrain from joining the working groups because it will strain their resources.  
 
To date, the countries that dominate the production, cutting, polishing and 
retailing of diamonds 34 have been key leaders in the Process. These are the 
countries that have a substantial stake in reducing reputational risk to the global 
diamond industry.  Among other things, they have taken the responsibility to 
chair the Process, they have volunteered to build capacity within the working 
groups and they have contributed technical assistance to developing countries35 
(USA, 2008; Interview with Stephane Chardon August 7 2008; interview with 
Charles Arnott, August 8 2008) 
                                                 
33 Angola and Sierra Leone even had a certification system that predated the KPCS so that they could 
access international markets. 
 
34 In 2003 South Africa was the first chair of the KPCS, followed by Canada (2004), the Russian Federation 
(2005), Botswana (2006), the European Commission (2007), India (2008). Forthcoming chairs are Namibia 
(2009) and Israel (2010). The current chair of the KP is the member who held the position of vice-chair in 
the previous year.  
 
35 The European Commission has developed the KP website and chairs the Monitoring Working Group, the 
Canadians chair the Statistics Working Group and have provided technical assistance and training to 
participants, and the USA has coordinated technical assistance to alluvial producer countries. The USA will 





While the efforts of these countries have been instrumental to incubate the 
Process, a voluntary and ad-hoc culture is unlikely to be sustainable in the 
future36. Developed countries actively leading the Process may become less 
inclined to continue investing in the Process as much as they have so far, as they 
perceive the reputational risks to the diamond industry to decline. On the other 
hand, it will remain in the interest of the target countries to continue to benefit 
from the transparency, conflict mitigation processes, and association to an 
international regime of the kind offered by the KPCS. Therefore, these countries 
need to build up capabilities and take an active leadership in the Process, so that 
they can make it a long-term mechanism to support their development.  
 
The 2005 Moscow declaration reiterated this point and called for participants and 
donors to provide appropriate technical assistance to alluvial diamond mining 
countries (KPCS, 2005). While this assistance has mainly been targeted at 
enabling alluvial and artisanal mining countries to implement the national internal 
controls, it may also be pertinent to build up their capacity to be more active in 
the management of Process. The institutionalization of the Working Group on 
Alluvial and Artisanal Production (WGAAP)37 is one forum where target countries 
inform the KPCS agenda. 
 
The WGAAP is composed of all the artisanal and alluvial producers in the KP 
and others (see Box 4.4). It is able to identify specific priority areas and inform 
the broader KPCS participants.  Articulated in the Moscow declaration, the then 
sub-group on artisanal and alluvial producers compiled several recommendations 
that countries should implement. These included some for regional coordination 
and areas for assistance from other KP participants and donors (KPCS, 2005).  
 
Regional coordination has focused upon tax policy to lessen the incentives of 
smuggling, and sharing information about trafficking routes and clandestine 
networks to support regional policing (KPCS, 2005). In line with this strategy, the 
Manu River Union countries of West Africa have currently harmonized their 
royalty rate at 3%. However, these countries generally agree that the royalty 
                                                 
36 While interviewing respondents for this study, the research uncovered different perspectives with regard 
to the longevity of the Kimberley Process. Some respondents felt that the KP had a very finite time line – 
and cited the Fve-year (renewable) waiver granted by the World Trade Organisation. While there was no 
clear consensus on the likely duration of the KP, it is important to note that no respondent from the South 
saw the KP as a short term solution. Southern respondents saw participation in the KP as a way to 
legitimize their broader development goals with the affirmation of this global process.  
 
37 The WGAAP developed out of a sub-group for artisanal and alluvial countries that was coordinated by 
the Working Group on Monitoring. The sub-group was instituted at the Ottawa Plenary (2004) and the 




must be increased to 4% and they are in talks to coordinate this hike38 (Interview 
with Usman Boie Kamara, Sept 18 2008). 
 
Although the KP appears to have 
increased communication and 
coordination amongst West African 
member countries, in Latin America 
regional coordination has had less 
success. With only three countries (Brazil, 
Guyana and Venezuela) participating in 
the KPCS, there has not been extensive 
harmonisation regionally, especially since 
in mid-2008 Venezuela suspended itself 
from the Process for approximately two 
years, that is, until it can achieve the 
minimum requirements of the KPCS.  
 
With regard to donor contributions, the 
WGAAP suggested that a functional 
cadastre system39 is key to effectively 
regulating artisanal diamond mining. The 
group also encouraged ‘relevant 
assistance’ to be provided by donors to 
establish a cadastre system to increase the capacity of countries to monitor the 
KPCS (KPCS, 2005). In Sierra Leone, a cadastre has been in development since 
2006 with the support from UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The development of 
the cadastre falls under DFID’s Diamond Sector Program. DFID acknowledges 
that a working cadastre would increase the efficiency to regulate the sector by 
providing basic geological information to support the licensing system, 
transparency of government revenues and resolve disputes over ownership of 
mining rights (Stringer, 2008: 4).  
 
However, as of October 2008, Sierra Leone’s cadastre was only partially 
operational while the contracts of the international consultants that developed the 
system were not renewed (Interview with Mariata Flee, Sept 18 2008). Most 
concerning is that there is no clear information about when the cadastre will be 
completed, or who was coordinating this process (either at the Department of 
Geological Surveys, the Ministry of Mineral Resources, or the Development 
                                                 
38For instance: the November 2008 Manu River Union meeting, attended by KPCS members from Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. CSOs also attended the meetings and are beginning to organise at 
a regional level.   
 
39 The cadastre is a layered information management system that works to support regulation, licensing and 
tax collection within the mining sector. The cadastre is made up of a Geographic Information System (GIS) 
database and a database of mining licences. The cadastre is a potential monitoring, dispute resolution, and 
anti-corruption tool. (Interview with Alpha Turray, Sept 23 2008).  
Box 4.4 WGAAP Composition 
Chair Angola 
Vice Chair South Africa 
Regional 
Coordinators 
Brazil (Latin America), 
Sierra Leone (West 
Africa), DRC (Central 













Angola, Brazil, the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Central 
African Republic, Guinea, 
Ghana, Guyana, 
Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Tanzania, 
Togo, Zimbabwe, Liberia 
(Venezuela), (Côte 
d´Ivoire), the Russian 
Federation, the European 
Community, Partnership 




Assistance Coordination Office).  This example has been presented to highlight 
how the Kimberley Process is able to make recommendations with clear bilateral 
policy implications for donors and recipient countries. However, when there are 
challenges at this bilateral level there is no clear path for the dialogue to return to 
the KP’s intergovernmental arena for greater deliberation, political will building, 
and/or alternative strategy development.  
 
A second example that relates to monitoring the KPCS was highlighted by 
respondents at the Gold and Diamond Office (GDO) in Freetown. The valuation 
officer in charge of reporting export statistics to the KPCS complained that he 
had “never seen the report of the review visit to Sierra Leone and he had been 
asked to prepare for the second round” (Interview with Mohammed Bah, Sept 29 
2008). A search of the KP public website also revealed that there is no summary 
report of the Sierra Leonean review visit. Additionally, concern was raised that 
there has been no effort to communicate with other national stakeholders on the 
findings of the KP review. Several stakeholders expressed the opinion that 
‘review teams should be accountable to the country by, for example, presenting 
their findings in an open forum in the country’. By doing this, it has the “potential 
to help the country and help the review team” (Interview with Abu Brima, Sept 16 
2008).   
 
While the cadastre system and review visit examples illustrate different 
circumstances managed by different working groups40, they both point to 
insufficient information management systems between national and international 
KPCS processes.  This may be due to the Process not publically releasing all the 
information that it gathers –  thus, it becomes the responsibility of the national 
KPCS coordinator to disseminate information within the country. This is further 
exacerbated because the tripartite and participatory structure of the KP is not 
always replicated at the national level, due to a lack of capacity and/or, perhaps, 
of political will to be inclusive at the national level. 
 
The next section discusses the broader implementation of the KPCS at a national 
level. Sierra Leone is one of the KPCS target countries and a founding member 
of the Process. It has made significant progress towards formalizing and 
regulating its diamond trade. Since the end of its civil war, its official diamond 
exports have jumped from about $10 million in 2000 to over $141 million in 2007 
(GDO, 2008). While Sierra Leone is undoubtedly better off than during the years 
of civil war, this study will show that there is still a substantial potential to be 




                                                 
40 The example of the cadastre system was recommended by the Working Group for Alluvial and Artisanal 
Producers. The Working Group on Monitoring is responsible for coordinating review visits to member 




4.2 Sierra Leone’s Implementation of the KPCS  
 
A view that was repeatedly 
expressed throughout Sierra Leone 
was that the KPCS needs to be 
conceptualized as an evolving 
process. The greater level of 
transparency, accountability and 
international cooperation that 
Kimberley encourages must also be 
combined with increasing economic 
prosperity and social development in 
local diamond producing 
communities – which would thereby 
increase national security, and 
translate into better international 
security. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources and the Gold and 
Diamond Office are the two agencies 
primarily responsible for the 
implementation of the Kimberley 
Process. The Law Reform 
Commission has also been tasked with developing the necessary legislation to 
fulfill Kimberley obligations (Kamara, 2008). The Gold and Diamond Office 
(GDO) has been designated as the exporting authority responsible for valuing 
diamond exports, collecting royalties, issuing KP certificates, ensuring that 
diamonds are exported in tamper proof containers, and reporting export statistics 
to the KP statistics working group. That is, the GDO is primarily responsible for 
fulfilling sections II and III of the KP minimum requirements. The Ministry of 
Mineral Resources (MMR)41 takes the lead on implementation of the internal 
controls, or Section IV of the KP. The MMR’s responsibilities include regulating 
the production, monitoring and marketing of the domestic diamond production-
supply chain. The GDO and the MMR share the responsibility for co-operation 
and transparency outlined in Section V of the Kimberley Process, with the GDO 
primarily reporting export statistics and the MMR capturing information about 
production and license holders.  
 
Thus, the MMR issues the licences and the GDO has to ensure that only 
licensed exporters and their agents take diamonds out of the country. Within this 
current system, concern has been raised that there is not a systematic way for 
information to flow between the two agencies (Interview with Mohammed Bah, 
Sept 29 2008). To illustrate, the GDO does not have access to the database of 
                                                 
41 The MMR is constituted of the Mines Department, and the Geological Surveys Division 
 
Box 4.5 Diamonds in Sierra Leone  
 
Diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone 
in the 1930s during British colonial rule. Civil 
war only erupted in the early 1990s, fuelled 
by high levels of corruption, inequality and 
mismanagement of the country’s wealth 
(Campbell, 2002; Reno, 1995). When the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mobilized 
in 1992, in an attempt to redress these 
inequalities, initially there was popular 
support for them. However, given the terror 
tactics used by the movement and 
subsequent human suffering, the RUF were 
not viewed as freedom fighters for long; still,  
they maintained their strength through the 
control of many of the nation’s diamond 
mines (Grant and Taylor, 2004:387, 
Campbell 2002:71). During 1992-1998 it is 
estimated that the RUF pocketed between 
$25 million and $125 million per year from 
the sale of rough diamonds – crucial to their 
war effort during which over six million 
people were displaced (Campbell, 2002:xxii). 
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export licences granted by the MMR. This means that they are not able to 
monitor activity on, or validate the legitimacy of the licenses that pass through 
their offices.   
 
One of the biggest obstacles to effective communication appears to be that the 
GDO and MMR are situated in two very distinct parts of the government42. In an 
effort to address this problem, the GDO will shortly be relocated under the MMR 
in order for the two agencies to be in closer administrative proximity (Ibid). The 
restructuring represents dynamism within the Sierra Leonean implementation of 
the KPCS and should be seen as a positive step towards developing better 
processes for information management.   
 
As previously mentioned, the GDO is responsible for producing accurate export 
statistics, which they are obliged to report to the global KPCS. The MMR on the 
other hand is responsible for production statistics which it also reports to the 
statistics database of the KPCS. In 2007, the KPCS Stats working group noted 
that Sierra Leone’s capacity to generate statistics on exports was greater than its 
ability to record production (GDO, 2007). The primary reason for this is that all 
export statistics are collected when legitimately exported diamonds pass through 
the GDO offices for valuation, tamper proof sealing and authorization on their 
way to international markets (Interview with Mrs. Sawyer, Sept 19 2008). This 
systemized process makes them fairly easy to record and report. On the other 
hand, production statistics have to be collected on the ground, through the 
monitoring of the mines, licence holders, dealers and other stakeholders in the 
diamond production-supply chain. This is very difficult since the marketing of 
diamonds in Sierra Leone is quite complicated and opaque (PAC and NMJD, 
2006).  
 
In 2006, Levin and Gbrie undertook a study on “Diamond Marketing and Pricing 
in Sierra Leone” which aimed to shed light on the internal production-supply 
chain by cataloguing the various routes that artisanal diamonds travelled within 
the domestic market. Small-scale and artisanal production (using rudimentary 
tools, equipment and unskilled labour) accounts for more than 60 percent of all 
diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. Levin and Gbrie’s study identified the five major 
types of artisanal production43 and delved into the different types of financing 
                                                 
42 Currently, the Gold and Diamond Office operates under the authority of the National Revenue Authority 
(NRA), the agency responsible for collecting taxes and royalties. Although collecting royalties is one of the 
functions of the GDO (and the reason that it was initially placed under the NRA) the office will soon 
become  part of the Ministry of Mineral Resources. 
 
43 Artisanal production can be arranged through a system of wage labour, tributor, bucket and pile, gado 
and overkicking and cooperative mining. For a more detailed analysis, please see Levin and Gbrie, 2006. 
 
The dominant type of artisanal production in Sierra Leone happens through the Tributor System, where 
supporters provide the tools, equipment, and licenses for production.  Supporters may also provide a small 
daily subsistence wage, accommodation healthcare costs and death benefits depending on the agreement 
that they have with the diggers. When diamonds are found, the supporter, license holder and diggers share 
the winnings depending on a predetermined share structure. An common breakdown may be that the 
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Box 4.6 Sierra Leones Mineral Sector Strategy  
 
At a July 2008 workshop organized at the State House, 
the President, Ernest Bai Koroma,  reiterated that “in 
order to realize the sector’s potential and for the 
Government and the people of Sierra Leone to derive 
greater benefits from its mineral wealth, more needs to 
be done to address the constraints facing the sector’s 
growth and management”  
 
These constraints include:  
• legislation that is out of date and poorly structured; 
• lack of geological information to attract investment; 
• Inadequate infrastructure; 
• inadequate assessment and collection of 
revenues; 
• inadequate management of environmental matters, 
• poor community governance structures;   
• lack of capacity in institutions tasked with 
managing the sector; 
• ineffective monitoring mechanisms; 
• inconsistent and non-transparent licensing and 
transfer of licences. 
 
Priority reform areas identified include: 
• review of mineral rights and appropriate actions 
taken;  
• restructuring and building capacity of the Ministry 
of Mineral Resources; 
• developing appropriate legislation and regulations; 
• assisting communities to improve their governance 
structures; 
• assessing and collecting revenues from taxes and 
fees to maximize financial returns; Processing 
more effective allocation of mineral sector revenue 
to mining communities; developing an 
infrastructure policy       (MMR, 2008).   
(formal and informal), and actors that are involved in this chain. Needless to say, 
this study revealed that the marketing of diamonds is very complex in Sierra 
Leone. Individuals take on multiple roles (both dealers and supporters), illegal 
and legal channels are highly intertwined, and both the systems of licensing and 
revenue collection are complex. In fact, the study illustrates how the current 
configuration makes it very difficult for Sierra Leone to accurately and effectively 
track diamonds – as required by the KPCS.  
 
Yet, the benchmarks for 
internal control and reporting 
that underlie the KPCS have 
enabled Sierra Leone to 
recognise the areas where 
they lack capacity to fully 
implement Kimberley. In this 
way, participation in the 
KPCS has created the 
necessary policy space to 
address broader issues 
(Interview with Abu Brima, 
Sept 16 2008).  The KPCS 
has been a launching pad for 
developing new laws, 
increasing monitoring 
capacity, collecting geological 
information and generally 
formalizing the sector 
(Interview with Usman Boie 
Kamara, Sept 18 2008). In 
fact, the government has 
acknowledged that “the newly 
developed Kimberley Process 
protocols for the trading and 
exporting of rough diamonds 
have necessitated the 
drafting of a (Consolidated) 
Act to give legal efficacy to 
the Kimberley Process 
requirement” (LRC, 2007:3). 
The next section will look at 
some of the instruments that 
have been used to build national capacity to regulate the mining sector.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
supporter keeps 40%, licence holder 30% and diggers (up to 50 people) share the last 30% (Levin and 








In 2004, the Government of Sierra Leone established a set of principles that 
would guide the development of their mineral policy reform44. Currently the 
mineral sector operates under the 1996 Mines and Minerals Act. However, this 
Act is being reformed, in light of several shortcomings in the present body of 
legislation. 45 One inconsistency has been the enactment of the “Diamond 
Cutting and Polishing Act of 2007”, while the Consolidated Mines and Minerals 
Bill of 2007 has not yet been ratified. The first law relates to value-adding 
processing of diamonds (which Sierra Leone does not currently do), while the 
second and more pertinent law seeks to regulate the extraction of mineral 
resources.  
 
Pertinently, a consultative process has been lead by the Law Reform 
Commission of Sierra Leone to update the 1996 law with a Consolidated Act46. 
Working papers were commissioned from civil society, local governments, 
chieftaincies, government departments, international industry, and donors. These 
key stakeholders have underscored the need for this law to clarify the licensing 
and revenue collection structure, subsoil and prospecting rights, labour and 
community relations and the environment.  As of March 2009, the 2007 bill was 
still stalled before Parliament because of a change in government.  
 
The recently elected All Peoples Congress led by Ernest Bai Koroma assumed 
office in September of 2007, and has decided to hold off implementing the 
Consolidated Mines Act until there has been a review of mining contracts (similar 
to the ones carried out in other resource rich African countries such as Nigeria 
and Angola). While this should be interpreted as a positive move, Sierra Leonean 
government policy appears to be rather ambiguous. This is because a 
complementary initiative, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
that also seeks to publish and make payments transparent, between corporations 
and governments, has been put on the back-burner according to civil society 
                                                 
44 Principles included: clear and unambiguous laws and regulations, a fair and competitive trading 
environment, improved job and investment opportunities, increase the skill and knowledge of the 
workforce and finally to improve the security and protection of investors, the workforce and the 
environment (Ketlaar, 2005:5) 
 
45 As  described by the Law Reform Commission of Sierra Leone in the Mines and Minerals Project Report 
of 2007, shortcomings  include “the impact on health and the environment of mining in Sierra Leone; the 
Role of Chiefs and other authorities in the granting on concessions; industrial relations in the mining sector; 
the marketing of Alluvial Diamonds; and the need for legislation to give legal effect to the Kimberley 
process in Sierra Leone” (LRC, 2007:6). 
 
46 With regard to the KPCS legislation, that is encapsulated within the Consolidated Mines and Minerals 
Bill 2007, the Law Reform Commission “was greatly assisted by studying the Clean Diamond Act (USA) 




respondents (Interview with Alfred Carew, Sept 11; Abu Brima, Sept 16; 
Theophilus Gbenda, Sept 19 2008).  
 
As previously stated, a major impetus for Sierra Leone to develop the 
Consolidated Act has been the KPCS. This re-visiting of the policy framework 
has been an opportunity to go beyond Kimberley and towards development. 
However, since the Act has not been passed, Sierra Leone is still operating 
under an out of date legal framework47. Nevertheless, even within the less 
stringent 1996 framework, the government lacks capacity on the ground to 




The Ministry of Mineral Resources is responsible for monitoring the production 
and marketing of the diamond supply chain. As described by the Director of 
Mines, several challenges that hinder comprehensive monitoring include a lack of 
physical resources, technical ability of monitoring officers, geological information 
and a need to reform public sector wages to combat corruption (Interview with 
Usman Boie Kamara, Sept 18 2008).  
 
Further investigation in the Kono district revealed that Mines Monitoring Officers 
(MMOs) lack the most basic tools to do their jobs, such as funds for 
transportation to the mines or for field accommodation (these two reasons were 
given by all the MMOs interviewed).  There is also some circumstantial evidence 
that mine owners and managers provide MMOs with transport, food, and 
accommodation;  in some instances  they even subsidize their wages (MMOs 
make less than $100 USD/month) at the end of the month (Interview with 
Mohammed Turray, Sept 10; Alfred Carew, Sept 11, Kassim Bassma, Sept 24 
2008).  
 
As this type of situation reduces the credibility of monitoring efforts there is a 
Public Sector Reform Program underway to look at the pay scales and minimum 
competencies of all public employees. While reform of the public sector is still a 
couple of years away (Interview with Edward Kamara, Sept 30 2008), several 
steps have been taken to increase capacity. For instance, through USAID’s 
Integrated Diamond Management Project, MMOs were provided with 
motorcycles, radios and two weeks of training, among other things, to enable 
them to do their jobs. MMOs reported that this program provided them with a 
sense of purpose and professionalism during the USAID program evaluation 
(Tutusaus et al, 2007: 17). Questionnaires administered during this research also 
validated this finding, with most of the MMOs referring to USAID’s support.  The 
USAID evaluation also concluded that “if the program had followed up with these 
                                                 
47 Sierra Leone fast tracked a Bill entitled the “Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act 2006” to put 





MMOs (and with training to other MMR officials in the field) this could have made 
a significant difference in the management of the sector at the local levels” (Ibid). 
 
Currently, MMOs receive a short training course (about 2 weeks) when they 
begin their jobs, then intermittent training once in their district. The Ministry 
recognizes that this training is not sufficient, and it is an issue which they are 
trying to address (Interview with Usman Boie Kamara, Sept 18 2008). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to recruit a higher and more qualified calibre of 
professionals because Sierra Leone does not have any training facilities. Thus, 
the Ministry is collaborating with the University of Antakwa in Ghana to train 
mining engineers, which will likely begin in the forthcoming academic year. They 
are also in the process of organizing funding for this capacity building from the 
European Union (Ibid).  
 
The completion of the cadastre system, previously described, will also greatly 
support the MMO’s work by giving them the tools to accurately monitor the 
sector. The cadastre records land ownership, maps geological information, GPS 
coordinates and type of production. To highlight the potential of the cadastre, the 
2008 dispute between London Mining and African Minerals (two industrial 
diamond mining companies) over ownership of mine tailings was solved using 
the cadastres database (Interview with Marieta Flee, Sept 18 2008)48. Indeed, 
the cadastre adds immense prospects for information management in Sierra 
Leone if the software can be completed, the data fed into the database can be 
accurate and the necessary personnel can be taught how to use and access it.  
 
Lastly, it is nearly impossible for MMOs, skilled or unskilled, to monitor 
unorganized mining operations (Interview with Patrick Tongu, Sept 10; Moses 
Gbondo, Sept 13 and Abu Brima, Sept 16 2008). Currently, the extent of MMO’s 
work is to check that there is a valid license for the plot being mined and record 
production statistics49. Yet, in order for monitoring to be robust, the miners must 
get organized. This may be through unions, cooperatives or local authorities; 
unregistered and therefore illegal miners (or gados as they are locally known) 
must also be brought into the formal system.   
 
Respondents in this study repeatedly emphasized that formalization of this sector 
was necessary to fully implement the KPCS. They also noted that implementing 
the KPCS was only the first step towards socioeconomic development of the 
mining sector – which was a priority for all respondents interviewed at the local 
and national level. A similar theme also emerged from the Diamond Development 
                                                 
48 London Mining and African Minerals are two large scale diamond mining companies. The information 
for large scale mining is kept on the cadastre database in Freetown. Out of the four planned databases, the 
Freetown database that stores information about large scale operations is the closest to being completed.  
 
49 Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are two sets of accounts kept by licence holders (Mohammed 
Turray, Bockarie Kamara). The first are the ‘official’ accounts that are shown to the monitoring officers 




Initiative (2008) study that developed Standards and Guidelines for governments, 
investors, civil society and donors. Based on  a national consultation in Sierra 
Leone the research found that, in order to prevent the threat of future conflict,   
development programs aimed at mining communities are needed that will   
develop local infrastructure, health, education and other social services (DDI, 
2008). 
 
4.4 Formalisation Strategies: Advocacy, Training and Incentives 
 
The following section will highlight current strategies for formalising the artisanal 
diamond marketing chain in Sierra Leone. These examples were gathered from 
civil society, governmental, and donor representatives in Sierra Leone. Although 




CSOs in Sierra Leone 
have been actively 
mobilizing the Sierra 
Leonean government 
and society since 
before the onset of 
the Kimberley 
Process. Since the 
late 1990s 
organizations in 
Sierra Leone have 
been working in 
coalition with national 
and international 
partners to address 
conflict diamonds50. 
After Kimberley was 
implemented, CSOs set their sights on more development oriented goals. Mr. 
Abu Brima, Director of the Network Movement for Justice and Development 
(NMJD),  has reiterated that “while we value the KPCS, we do not see the KPCS 
as the answer to our problems, we believe in a broader agenda for the mining 
sector including transparency, corporate engagement, mining reform and more – 
KPCS is only but a part of our campaign” (Interview with Abu Brima, Sept 16 
2008).  
 
                                                 
50 In 2000, the Partnership Africa Canada launches “The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and 
Human Security.” The report scrutinized the role of international governments and industry in the Sierra 
Leonean Civil War. The report was launched simultaneously in Freetown, Ottawa and Washington D.C. 
The Sierra Leonean launch was coordinated by the Network Movement for Justice and Development.  
 
Box 4.7 Multi-stakeholder Approach to Coordinate Learning  
 
Civil Society facilitates dialogue between communities and 
government to facilitate knowledge sharing between these 
actors. The NMJD and United Mine Workers Union have invited 
Mines Monitoring Officers (MMO’s) to training workshops with 
artisanal miners and license holders. These meetings provide 
an opportunity for MMOs to explain how licensing works, and 
their role and jurisdiction in this process.  
 
Currently, the licensing process is very bureaucratic (to be 
revised in the draft Consolidated Bill), which leads to miners 
working outside of the formal system.  
 
If miners have a better understanding of the benefits to 
formalisation, and they are given incentives to engage in formal 
processes, it will institutionalize the legitimate diamond 




The NMJD and its Campaign for Just Mining51 partners have sought to be a 
conduit between the local and national levels, and support the transfer of 
knowledge from miners to national policy makers and vice-versa52. Their 
programs have been developed to organise and train different segments within 
mining communities (including those involved in or affected by mining, such as 
women and youth) on the mining laws, licensing processes and fees, and their 
rights as citizens (Interview with Patrick Tongu, Sept 10 2008). The aim is to 
create awareness, momentum and mobilization at the community level to give 
legitimacy to civil society campaigning at the national level, as well as assist 
communities to demand their rights. Their strategy is that “civil society should not 
be the only ones to shout – it is important for community voices to also be heard” 
(Interview with Abu Brima, Sept 16 2008) Thus, NMJD has set up local task 
forces and platforms to facilitate community action.  
 
Civil society is also increasing awareness and transparency about the mining 
industry in Sierra Leone. For instance, the Association of Journalists on Mining 
and Extractives (AJME) is coordinating and capacitating the national media on 
mining issues. Initially, the AJME was a project of the NMJD53, then it became an 
independent organisation in 2005. The AJME is constituted by 45 members from 
electronic and print media from around the country. Their mandate is to use the 
media to raise the profile of the mining sector within the general public, attract 
government attention to pressing and outstanding issues, and engage in 
international advocacy through ‘naming and shaming’ exploitative practices of 
international multinationals54 operating in Sierra Leone (Interview with Theophilus 
Gbenda, Sept 19 2008). Along with supporting members with publications in their 
                                                 
51 The NMJD houses the Campaign for Just Mining (CJM) was established in 2000 as a broad based 
coalition of Sierra Leonean and International Civil Society (NGOs, CBOs and Unions) that work in a 
concerted and collaborative effort towards social, environmental, human rights and equity issues in mining. 
The CJM secretariat is housed at the NMJD. The Campaign is currently not an autonomous organisation 
and works under the legal status of the NMJD who coordinate its funding and activities.  
 
52 The NMJD is headquartered in Freetown, however it has fully staffed offices in each of the four regions 
of Sierra Leone. Their Mining and Extractives and Governance programs are particularly focused on 
mining issues. Furthermore, the NMJD has developed a comprehensive reporting and knowledge 
management strategy that seeks to institutionalize how information is recorded and shared (Interview with 
Sallieu Kamara, Sept 9 2008) with the intention that the NMJD can strengthen its abilities as a learning 
organisation.  
 
53The  NMJD has held training sessions for journalists from the AJME on issues such as mining laws, 
KPCS, artisanal mining, child mining, concessions and contracts between multinationals and the 
Government of Sierra Leone, and  the role of international financial institutions. 
 
54 Koidu Holdings, a subsidiary of the Israeli owned multinational the Steinmetz Diamond Group, has been 
at the centre of a controversy surrounding the forced relocation of 284 households into inadequate living 
conditions without due consultation (NMJD, 2004:online). The controversy escalated in 2007 when two 
people protesting Koidu’s practices were shot by local police (Manson, 2007:online). This has led to the 
suspension of Koidu’s mining licence. Furthermore,  media coverage of  this incident prompted a journalist 
from Israel to visit Sierra Leone and work with the AJME to collect information for Israeli and other 




own news media, the AJME also will be publishing a quarterly newsletter for 
distribution to Sierra Leonean stakeholders and international actors through a 
web-based platform.  
 
Government    
 
One effort by the national government to formalise artisanal miners is the 
Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF). The DACDF seeks to 
create incentives for miners to use the legal production-supply chain.  The 
DACDF works by channelling ¼ of the 3% royalty collected at export back to 
mining communities, as a percentage of their reported production. It uses 
increased revenue for development to encourage localized monitoring and 
surveillance systems. Moreover, it promotes the registration of mining operations 
by community members and local authorities by providing a carrot rather than a 
stick approach to monitoring. 
  
The DACDF was initially proposed by a coalition of civil society, the DACDF 
Coalition55, which was established with USAID support (Interview with Alfred 
Carew, Sept 11 and Abdulaai Jalloh, Sept 25 2008). While civil society was 
involved in the conceptualisation of the initiative, the government has not 
engaged them in its formal implementation. However, civil society has continued 
to work towards DACDF objectives by sensitizing communities about how they 
can contribute to decision making of the Fund, as well as producing progress 
reports of the initiative (Interview with Abu Brima, Sept 16 2008). For instance, 
the coalition developed a “grading system for chiefdoms on the use of the funds, 
and their active community sensitization programs encouraged community 
members, including women, to question traditional leaders about the use of the 
funds and their prioritization” (Tutusaus et al, 2007:16). 
 
The Fund has had some successes in registering licences; however, it has 
struggled to find a way for mining communities to manage Fund money in a 
transparent way56 (Interview with Mohammed Turray, Sept 10 and Usman Boie 
Kamara, Sept 18 2008). Currently, the government is experimenting with different 
ways to build community governance of the Fund. This includes organizing 
                                                 
55 The DACD coalition has now broadened its agenda and now operates as the National Advocacy 
Coalition on the Extractives (NACE). A current priority for NACE is to work towards Sierra Leone’s 
compliance of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and they are coordinating with the 
international “Publish What You Pay” civil society coalition (Interview with Alfred Carew, Sept 11 2008).  
 
56 Money from the DACDF was initially channelled via the Chieftaincy back to the communities. However, 
decision making about how to spend the money on community development was not made in an open or 
participatory system – and some even regarded it as a form of patronage between the national government 
and local chieftaincy structures. The disbursements of the DACDF were halted in order to develop a system 
to manage the money. Earlier this year the Fund resumed, although now it is managed by the local councils 
who have a greater incentive to use the Fund for tangible development that meets the communities’ needs. 
This is because the local government are elected officials, unlike the Paramount Chiefs who have a lifetime 




workshops to teach chiefs and local government officials about processes for 
decision making and legitimately spending the money. The MMR is also 
considering a formal process to call for proposals; whereby communities would 
apply for money to support projects that are developed in a participatory manner 
and have built-in evaluation and monitoring mechanisms (Interview with Usman 
Boie Kamara, Sept 18 2008).  If the Fund can be managed properly, it has the 
potential for mining communities to reap more social and economic benefits from 
mining through:  (a) increased social expenditure; (b) a greater use of legal and 
traceable channels - therefore increasing compliance with Kimberley; and (c) 
stronger local governance structures - by empowering communities to negotiate 




A recurrent theme that was uncovered by this research is the demand for 
practical skills by artisanal miners. One prominent initiative that used skills 
development as part of their formalisation strategy was a United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) project, the Peace Diamond Alliance 
(PDA). The PDA ran during 2005 – 2007. This was the third phase57 of USAID’s 
engagement in the Sierra Leonean mining sector, which began in 1999. Initially, 
the objective of USAID’s intervention was to bring Sierra Leone in compliance 
with the KPCS through peace-building programs. Later on, through the PDA, the 
USA also supported the formation of cooperatives in the Kono and Tongo Fields 
district, in order to organise miners.  
 
One technique that the PDA used to encourage participation by miners was to 
impart them training in small stone valuating methods, as well as in land 
reclamation techniques (Interview with Abdullai Jalloh, Sept 25 2008). 
Approximately 600 people received training (10% women) in 2007 through such 
PDA projects (Tutusaus et al, 2007: vii). One miner who had taken part in the 
PDA,  interviewed for this research, said that he benefited from training in 
categorization of diamonds in terms of colour clarity, percentage, carat-age and 
price (Interview with Daniel Strong, Sept 16 2008). Also, of the five diggers 
interviewed for this study, he was the one who had the most comprehensive 
knowledge about the diamond licensing process and the only one who knew that 
Sierra Leone participated in a global process to track diamonds in order to 
prevent conflict58.  
                                                 
57 During 1999 – 2004 USAID operated in the diamond sector under the Diamond Policy and Management 
Project (DIPAM) and focused upon peace-building policies in the diamond sector (Interview with Abdulaai 
Jalloh, Sept 25 2008). The second phase, the Integrated Diamond Management Program (2004 – 2007) 
strived to “bring diamond mining and marketing into the formal sector  (and) increase government revenues 
through taxes and licenses while reducing security threats from diamond smuggling” through national and 
local engagement (MSI, 2005:2). 
 
58 Five diamond diggers were interviewed in the Kono district between September 14 and 20, 2008. Three 
of the five people interviewed had knowledge about reforms in the diamond regulations. One respondent 
had participated in the PDA and was significantly more knowledgeable than the others. Furthermore, this 
53 
 
Box 4.8 SINAVA Women’s Cooperative  
 
SINAVA is a community based organisation and was a 
member of the USAID’s PDA. SINAVA operates in 
Tongo Fields, one of the largest artisanal diamond 
mining areas of Sierra Leone. The women’s 
cooperative is “using the revenue from mining activities 
to increase their own incomes and to invest more 
successfully in their agricultural and trade projects” 
(USAID, 2005: online). This has included reclaiming 
mined out land for the cultivation of rice, and 
establishing a micro-lending program to support 
alternative livelihoods for community members.  
 
In 2004, SINAVA identified priorities such as : (a) 
institutional capacity building by defining the roles of the 
Board of Directors; (b) identifying and implementing 
formal training programs on core skills; (c) establishing 
financial management systems; and (d) attracting and 
maintaining donor funding (MSI, 2004: 4). This final 
objective is especially pertinent since the PDA was 
discontinued by USAID in 2006.   
 
Margaret Momoh, SINAVA’s President has said that 
“the PDA helped us to organize around diamond mining 
activities, which we’ve never done before. It has also 
helped up to stop illicit mining in the chiefdom.” (USAID, 
2005:online). SINAVA is a good example of how 
grassroots projects can help to reach KPCS and 
development objectives.  
 
Although the PDA was 
discontinued59, reports 
indicate that some of its 
major successes included 
imparting practical skills and 
training artisanal miners 
about their rights. This two-
fold strategy provided the 
necessary incentives for 
miners to want to participate 
in development programs 
because they could see that 
they would receive tangible 
returns (such as more money 
or services) from doing so. In 
lieu of the PDA, several 
government and civil society 
representatives referred to a 
need to continue developing 
miners’ skills, as an effective 
strategy for formalising their 
activities and bringing them 




Government’s NGO coordination office, which aims to spread development 
programs and encourage community and local government collaboration, 
reported that there are “very few NGOs concentrating specifically on the 
extractives” (Interview with Mr. Toure, Sept 12 2008). This is very worrying 
because donors, who in the past have supported ‘on-the-ground’ initiatives,  now 
seem to be shying away from these types of programmes. For instance, the 
USAID mining strategy in Sierra Leone has shifted away from local programming 
and now only engages with national policy stakeholders (Interview with Abdullai 
Jalloh, Sept 25 2008). Representatives from USAID in Sierra Leone noted 
                                                                                                                                                 
respondent reported that he was able to pass along skills gained in his training to some of his colleagues 
(Interview with Daniel Strong, Sept 17 2008). 
 
59 The PDA’s support for artisanal diamond mining cooperatives only lasted one season. The project was 
cancelled because of the low returns on investment. Private investment to the project was of approximately 
$70 000 and had returns of under $5000. Some reasons for this low return were unviable land, lack of 
geological data, delayed financing, poor trust and lack of ownership amongst members and early rains 
(Levin and Turay, 2008). Nevertheless, this project did not prove the cooperative model as unviable, 
however future projects must integrate special attention to: “design, pacing, ownership, training, 




concern with this shift as they are aware that problems and threats in the mining 
communities still exist. However, they reported that all the money for mining 
projects in Sierra Leone had ‘dried up’ (Ibid). 
 
Similarly, the UK’s DFID, Sierra Leone’s largest bilateral donor, also works to 
develop the potential of the diamond sector. DFID’s Diamond Sector Program 
seeks to support the objectives of the KPCS as well as enable diamonds to be a 
conduit for development. Yet, their programming has never directly supported 
grassroots mining projects. Instead, they have channelled some support 
grassroots through civil society organisations active on the ground (Stringer, 
2008).  
 
For instance, the United Mine Workers Union (UMU) benefited from DFID 
support from 2004 to the end of 2008 (Interview with Abiosseh Morrison, Sept 11 
2008). Since 2004, UMU has been informing and organising miners in an attempt 
to create a more contractual relationship between diggers and license holders. 
They have developed a document entitled “Terms and Conditions of Services of 
Work for Grass Roots Diggers” in this regard. The Union is using its position as 
an industrial relations intermediary to negotiate a minimum wage and benefits 
package for artisanal miners60. UMU does not currently charge artisanal diggers 
any union dues for this work because of the level of informality within the sector. 
As DFID funding is wrapping up, the Union is currently looking for alternative 
resources to continue this work,  because they recognise that artisanal diggers 
need to be brought into a formal relationship with employers and with the state 
for Sierra Leone, in order to benefit from their diamonds (Ibid).   
 
The two experiences highlighted above, USAID’s support through the PDA and 
DFID’s engagement with UMU,  show that donor support is starting to fade for 
on-the-ground projects in the mining sector. Perhaps this is because the KPCS is 
now perceived to be functioning well and conflict in Sierra Leone has subsided. 
Pertinently, field research suggests that developing strategies to support the 
formalisation of artisanal miners is essential for an effective system to track 
diamonds. Without this type of organisation, administrative tools such as 
legislation, geological information or increased resources for monitoring are 
unlikely to substantially increase the incentives for artisanal miners to use formal 
channels - unless these prove to be more lucrative for miners.  
 
As donors finance over 70% of Sierra Leone’s national budget, this shift away 
from grassroots programming is likely to have significant repercussions for 
national government and civil society capacity to support formalisation through 
nationally led initiatives. As noted by the NGO coordination office, there is 
already a shortage of capacity building organisations working towards the 
                                                 
60 Currently, the UMU has not been able to negotiate a settlement with a majority of the artisanal and small-
scale license holders. Generally, the Union proposes an average wage of about $100/month. The license-




formalisation of artisanal miners.  Thus, in order for the KPCS to achieve its 
mandate to eliminate conflict diamonds, it will remain important for donors to 
continue to engage in projects that support efforts to capacitate miners and 
communities - in tandem with the development of legislation to regulate and 
monitor the diamond sector.  
 
Summing up, the Kimberley Process has attempted to institutionalize prevention 
of conflict diamonds by fostering international cooperation amongst countries, 
industry and civil society. Through annual meetings, permanent working groups, 
and through coordinating technical assistance to target countries, the KPCS is 
seeking to create a global process to trace diamonds from export to retail. Within 
the national study of Sierra Leone, it was apparent that diamond smuggling is still 
occurring61. Moreover, conflicts are also still ongoing in diamondiferous countries 
such as Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. This study has found that the potential for 
diamonds to be channelled towards conflict can only be mitigated if diamond 
diggers and other national production-supply actors perceive diamonds are 
traded equitably. It appears that socio-economic development is an important 
element for eliminating the widespread smuggling of diamonds – which will in 
turn raise national revenues, provide more resources for development and 
reinforce the prevention of conflict.   
 
Supporting the formalisation of artisanal diamond mining may require the KPCS 
to find innovative ways to harness the strength that it has as an 
intergovernmental process to increase capability of national actors to manage 
grassroots initiatives. In this regard, it may be important for the KPCS to develop 
mechanisms that facilitate knowledge sharing beyond direct KPCS member 
participants and observers, and include stakeholders who seek to use the 
experience and policy environment that the KPCS offers for broader 
developmental objectives. It may also be beneficial for the KPCS to invest in 
developing the capacity of the target nations so that they can eventually take a 
leadership role in the process. The KPCS was instituted to support conflict-prone 
diamond producing countries, thus it is in their best interest to see that the 
process continues to innovate and remains a driver of development.    
                                                 
61 In the Kono district, seven government regulators including two Field Mines Monitoring Officers, three 
Senior Mines Monitoring Officers, a Government Mining Engineer and the Area Superintendant were 
interviewed for this research. Each of these officials reported that there continues to be smuggling of 
diamonds in Sierra Leone. There was a range of answers towards the severity of the smuggling; with most 
reporting that smuggling had declined since the onset of Kimberley. The main factors that they reported for 
contemporary smuggling were personal enrichment, smuggling by foreign nationals and porous borders 







This study introduced the concept of ethical trade, artisanal and small scale 
mining, and production-supply chain governance as they relate to globalized 
commodity networks. The study incorporated two case studies, the Alliance for 
Responsible Mining, a non-governmental initiative and the intergovernmental 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The research focused upon identifying 
the motivation for incorporating ethical considerations into these trade networks, 
the types of actors who have participated in these initiatives, and the structures 
that have been created in order for them to reach their objectives. Finally, the 
study has attempted to illustrate the extent to which these initiatives have been 
learning institutions. It has done this by examining the processes that have been 
put in place to effectively manage knowledge as a catalyst for innovation.   
 
5.1 Knowledge Management and Learning Strategies 
 
This examination identified some of the processes by which ARM’s fair trade gold 
and KPCS conflict free diamond production-supply chains integrated knowledge 
and learning to reach their objectives. Initially, this paper conceptualized that 
knowledge is negotiated among different actors of the supply chain. For instance, 
at the sites of mineral extraction, in the domestic marketing and trading, at the 
value-adding, branding, and retailing stages. It also postulated that learning could 
be driven by global discourses, trends and research. Within the context of this 
research, publicity and consumer awareness about the sourcing of the natural 
resources, the articulation of corporate social responsibility best practices by 
industry, and the call for more representative governance in international trade 
have all played a part in the inception of these initiatives.   
 
Indeed, the findings of this research do confirm that knowledge has many points 
of entry into the supply chain and that it takes a significant amount of 
coordination for this knowledge to be translated into learning for organisational 
strengthening. The study also observed that resources had to be strategically 
invested to facilitate this learning process. These findings coincide, to a large 
extent, with the contemporary literature on supply chain governance: they find a 
correlation between institutional capacity and the presence of a coordination 
body (Bitran et al 2006; Bitran et al 2007). The studies have found that 
progressive institutions are using specialized organisations to manage the 
“integration and coordination of materials, processes, information flows and 
multiple producers at each trading location” (Arroyo-Lopez and Bitran, 2008).  
 
The study of ARM revealed that it has a very participatory model of governance 
that includes structures to support knowledge management and learning.  Their 
strategy has included facilitating continuous learning along the supply chain by 
partnering  producer with support organisations, developing toolkits, harnessing 
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professional and grassroots knowledge and supporting peer-learning amongst 
producer organisations.  
 
To recap, the Alliance has actively collaborated with related initiatives including 
co-coordinating the RESPOMIN Latin American ASM knowledge network, 
participating in the events of the CASM Secretariat, and drawing upon the 
expertise of the ILO, Global Mercury Project and Ashoka. At the trading level, 
ARM is experimenting with ways to market its fair trade gold by establishing links 
with existing institutions such as the FairTrade Labelling Organisation and by 
creating a new social enterprise, The Ethical Bullion Company, that will provide 
further economic benefits for mining communities and become an instrument of 
ARM’s organisational sustainability.  
 
ARM’s Secretariat has been an essential in this robust pursuit of knowledge – in 
coordinating the Board of Directors, Technical Committee, Stakeholder Alliance 
as well as external relationships, mentioned above. A significant challenge for the 
Alliance is expanding beyond Latin America into other regions. As the initiative 
has grown out of a small number of committed individuals working within a fairly 
integrated supply chain, regional expansion depends, to a great extent, on 
identifying individuals and groups with a similar amount of dedication to ARM’s 
vision.   
 
On the other hand, the KPCS and its tripartite governance has been a positive 
step towards a more inclusive structure of international trade. Discussions with 
several KPCS participants suggest that there are good channels of 
communication between insiders of the process. Nevertheless, this research 
suggests that effective implementation of the Kimberley Process requires active 
dissemination of the ‘knowledge’ generated by the KPCS so that it can become 
referential information for parallel initiatives working towards the formalisation of 
ASM. As this study revealed, reaching KPCS objectives requires more than 
developing an international process supported by national legislation – on the 
ground efforts to organise miners and create incentives for them to use legitimate 
channels to market their diamonds is also essential to eliminate the potential of 
diamonds to fund conflict. 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the KPCS uses the full scope of its mandate to 
support these broader development aims. This could: (a) include creating 
avenues for representative and meaningful participation of local civil society in 
the formal process; (b) provide in-depth and public accounts of the statistical and 
monitoring information that it collects; and (c) develop an official strategy to 
collect, distribute and manage the information generated by 78 countries trading 
approximately 40 billion dollars of rough diamonds annually (KPCS, 2007). This 
institutionalisation of a knowledge management strategy may require a 
permanent, centralized, and resourced platform.  Optimistically, such 
investments may be possible because they would represent a progression of the 
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ethics of cooperation and transparency that has so far underpinned the KPCS 
project.  
 
A first step may be to build the capacity for the KPCS to learn from its 
experiences to date. The ‘Third Year Review’ of the KPCS conducted in 2006 is 
one way that the process has tried to evaluate itself. Additionally, the Royal 
Institute for International Relations (EGMONT) has been commissioned by the 
Belgium Government to undertake a study on Artisanal Diamond Mining that will 
potentially feed into KPCS policy62. Some experiences highlighted by EGMONT 
include: the Peace Diamonds Alliance cooperative of Sierra Leone, Diamonds for 
Development (D4D) program in Liberia, Mbuji-Mayi initiatives in the DRC and 
Mwadui diamond mine in Tanzania (Bockstael, 2008).   
 
Civil society is also calling for the KPCS to develop its research and monitoring 
capacity (PAC and GW, 2008: 1). Ultimately, it may be valuable for the KPCS to 
also go beyond commissioned research and develop ‘in-house’ capacity to be 
responsive to emerging themes, develop solution oriented strategies, be a 
reference point for national implementers and coordinate learning between KPCS 
stakeholders.  If information is managed well, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral 
agencies promoting the formalisation of the artisanal diamond sector could learn 
from these grassroots initiatives to guide the development of future projects.   
 
5.2 Innovations in International Trade   
 
A final issue that must be addressed relates to the original assumptions of this 
research. From the outset, the researcher assumed that ARM and the KPCS 
were both engaging in ethical trade. This is because both initiatives are working 
towards governing their production-supply chains for ethical considerations, that 
is, they are trying to make claims about inherent qualities of production rather 
than the physical attributes of the product. Moreover, each initiative targets 
similar beneficiaries (artisanal and small-scale miners) and they are working on 
associated commodities (gold and diamonds). In effect, both initiatives are re-
regulating the trade of a mineral resource in an attempt to reach an ethical 
objective.  
 
Even so, throughout the data collection and interview process for this research it 
became apparent that, while ARM does constitute an ethical trade network, 
KPCS does not. The primary reason why ARM should be conceptualized as an 
ethical trading network is because stakeholders working within it have claimed 
ownership of this concept. They have aligned their model with the FairTrade 
movement which is grounded in ethical trading principles. Their vision includes 
marketing the product to ethical consumers - who are considered the drivers of 
                                                 
62 EGMONT presented initial findings from its study on ASM diamond mining at the 2008 KPCS Plenary 




the ethical trade movement -, and they are learning from, and collaborating with, 
other ethical trading initiatives in order to multiply their movement.  
 
The KPCS, on the other hand, is not perceived as an ethical trade network by the 
civil society, industry or member countries that constitute it. Nevertheless, KPCS 
has innovated upon international trade norms by institutionalizing the 
participation of industry and civil society stakeholders. It has also successfully 
conceptualized international trade beyond liberalization strategies to include 
more qualitative and value based criteria, such as human security repercussions 
that can emerge from under-regulated international trade regimes63.  
 
Indeed, many ethical trading initiatives that currently are developing and 
implementing voluntary principles would regard an enforceable global 
governance of social, cultural, economic and environmental standards as their 
eventual goal. While the KPCS is a positive step towards adding values to 
international trade governance, its relatively narrow focus on ‘conflict’ does not 
encompass the full range of values within the contemporary ethical trading 
movement64. Yet, peace-building is a necessary requisite for more robust social 
and environmental objectives.   
 
In addition, it has been noted that there are also inherent limitations of using 
ethical trading as a primary development strategy because the scope of ethical 
trade is usually limited to a specific commodity, supply chain or initiative 
(Barrientos, 2000). Although the ethical trading movement presents opportunities 
for redefining the relationship between markets and societies (Ibidem, p.564), it is 
important that market mechanisms be used in conjunction with enforceable 
regulations that span across issues and sectors (Ibidem, p.566). Essentially, 
ethical trade seeks to set a precedent of fairer trading principles which will 
eventually lead to more robust public policies at an international level.   
 
ARM, for instance, has explicitly defined public policy development as one of its 
key objectives. It has acknowledged that without supportive public policies, the 
Alliance will face challenges in multiplying its model to different regions and 
contexts. An example of this is discussed by Hilson (2006), whose study 
proposed that ARM must take into consideration regional differences of the use 
for ASM produced gold. With a case study of Ghana, the study showed how 
artisanally produced gold is often used by national governments to supplement 
foreign exchange, rather than used for Western jewellery (Ibidem, p.390). Among 
other things, the discussion revealed that ARM’s project must be implemented in 
                                                 
63 For instance, the World Trade Organisation waiver that facilitates the KPCS has been able to set a 
precedent in international trade negotiations that there are certain circumstances where ‘free’ international 
trade amongst countries is not the most optimal solution.  
 
64 Ethical trade generally includes a basket of ethical objectives such as labour and environmental 
standards, social development outcomes, human and cultural rights 
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cooperation with governments in order for it not to be detrimental to domestic 
development or be perceived with hostility.  
 
Accordingly, ARM is already engaging with governments (for example the 
Peruvian Congress in 2008) and international institutions such as the World 
Bank’s Communities and Small Scale Mining Secretariat (CASM), to advocate 
and develop an international definition of ASM as a precursor to global public 
policy development (Interview with Laura Barreto, April 3 2008). Currently, there 
is the challenge of dialoguing with so many individual governments at the 
national policy level because this requires immense amounts of human and 
physical resources.  
 
Then again, a broad based intergovernmental initiative like the KPCS creates 
enabling policy environments at the national level; however targeted programs 
must be implemented that work towards socio-economic development for the 
process to be effective. Consequently, this case study of Sierra Leone confirms a 
finding of the ‘Third Year Review’ of the KPCS that internal controls remain  one 
of the largest challenges in artisanal producing countries65 (KPCS, 2006). It also 
resonates with findings from some CSOs’ own assessment of the KPCS (GW 
and PAC, 2005). 
 
In Sierra Leone, initiatives such as the DACDF or the development of 
cooperatives and training in valuation done by the USAID’s PDA seem to be 
essential for effectively attaining sufficient internal controls to stop smuggling.  In 
the wake of the PDA and other bi-lateral programs, CSOs involved in 
development programs should include tangible incentives for miners and 
communities to benefit from the formal diamond production-supply chain, and 
decrease the gains of using illicit channels.  
 
At this point, it is important to learn from, and harness strategies from multiple 
actors working towards similar goals. Several learning arenas are in place that try 
to facilitate knowledge sharing and dialogue within this sector. As this study has 
shown, there is also space for learning between the KPCS and ARM. For 
instance, a global initiative such as the KPCS needs to find ways to trickle down 
to local mining communities and support context specific capacity building 
programs. Smaller niche ethical trading initiatives such as ARM need to lobby for 
access into international policy fora to create a global enabling environment for 
their work. As both these initiatives have had significant success in generating 
public policy awareness and working with ASM miners respectively, policymakers 
and practitioners should devote some time to identifying and strengthening 
complementary strategies between initiatives with similar objectives that operate 
at different scales.  
  
                                                 
65 Out of this review, Kimberley Process participants have agreed to prepare a more comprehensive list of 
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Questions for research participants and users. Administered in Peru and Colombia, April – 
May, 2008.  
 




Can I use your name in my paper? Yes / No 
If no, can I use your responses anonymously? Yes / No 
  
Objectives and Strategies 
1. What is the nature of your work, and how does it fit into the supply chain? 
2.  How did you become involved in this area –  what was the process of evolution of your 
organisation? 
3. What are the objectives of your organisation (ie. developmental objectives, 
policymaking/advocacy, private sector for profit, technological expertise)?   
4.  Do you have a formal strategy for fulfilling objectives? What is it? 
5. Does the ethical trading initiative meet your strategic objectives to date? 
 
Participation, Learning and Innovation 
6. Who do you represent, and how does your organisation make decisions? 
7. Do you feel as though you, or the people you represent, have been able to participate? 
How equitable do you think this participation has been? 
8. Do you feel that you are able to influence the trajectory of the initiative?  And in which 
ways?  Please describe. 
9. Are there institutionalised mechanisms for communication, knowledge sharing and 
organisational learning in the ethical trading initiative? What are they?  
10. Are they effective for facilitating organisational innovation?  
 
The Influence of Research 
11. Have you ever participated in research – and about what themes, and in what capacity 
were you involved in the research? 
12. Where do you get most of your information/research from?. 
13. To what extent have research findings influenced your (organisations) actions?  
(Specific research projects and examples of organisational change from research): 
 
14. To what extent has the research had an impact? Has it: 
A. Changed attitudes?   
B. Changed informal practices? 
C. Changed formal policies? 
D. Policies been implemented on the ground? 
E. External third party evaluation of policy implementation?  
 
15. In what other ways does research support your work (ex. Advocacy, networking, evidence)? 
16. In what areas do you feel that you need more research support, and why? 
 
17. Is there anything else that you want to add, or to ask me? 
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Questions for research producers. Administered in Peru and Colombia, April-May, 2008.  
 




Can I use your name in my paper? Yes / No 
If no, can I use your responses anonymously? Yes / No 
 
Scope of Research 
1. What knowledge gap does your research seek to fill? 
2. How did you define the scope of your study? Please describe pertinent issues? 
3. How did you define the objectives of the research? 
 
Methods of Research 
4. In which ways, and using which methods did you conduct the research (quantitative 
research (surveys, statistics), qualitative research (participatory, semi-structured, 
anthropological)? 
5. Were you able to access the necessary information to fulfill objectives? Please describe? 
6. Who were the main informants in you research? 
 
Influence of Research 
7. Have research results been actively disseminated to stakeholders (informants, 
policymakers, practitioners ect)? What avenues are you using to disseminate the 
findings? 
8. Has there been any actions since dissemination? By whom?  
9. To what extent do you think that research findings impacted policy by providing additional 
evidence? 
a. Changed attitudes by informing actors  
b. Changed informal policies 
c. Cited as evidence for formal policy changes 
d. Implementation of policies on the ground 
e. Evaluative research of impact has been conducted.  
 
Research Partners, Collaborations, and Supporting Networks 
10. Did you work with any research partners? If so, who? What were their roles? 
11. How were decisions made amongst collaborating researchers? 
12. Was a formal mechanism set up to manage the research: budget, agenda setting, co-
ordination, advisory group? 
 






Questions for production-supply stakeholders. Administered in Sierra Leone, Sept, 2008 
 
(Mineworkers, miner owners, dealers, traders, exporters, producers organisations, unions) 
 




Can I use your name in my paper? Yes / No 
If no, can I use your responses anonymously? Yes / No 
  
Types of Work: 
 
1.  What type of work do you do in the diamond industry?  
2.  And who else do you closely work with (ex. work for? buy diamonds and/or sell diamonds to)?  
3.  Do you have a formal contract with them?  
4.  How did you get involved in this type of work? And how long have you been doing it? 
 
Type of Monitoring:  
 
 
5.  Has the way that you trade diamonds changed since 2002 (end of war / beginning of chain of 
certifications)?  
 
6.  If so, what new processes (laws and regulations) do you have to meet to legitimately trade 
diamonds?  
 
7.  How did you learn about these new laws? 
 
8.  Who is responsible for checking that diamonds are traded according to the new laws? (ex. 
mines monitoring officers,  local government, your superiors)  
 
9.  Do they do a good job? Yes / No 
if yes, how? If no, why?  
 
Capacity Building for Kimberley: 
 
10.  Has anyone (ex. your boss, colleagues, government, NGO) spoken / taught you about the 
reasons for the new laws? 
Why they are needed? And what your role is in implementing them? 
 
11.  If so, from your understanding why have the diamond trading processes been changed? 
Please give some examples of the new laws and regulations, and how the affect the way you 
work?  
 
12.  Do you feel the new rules make your work easier and more secure, or worse and harder? In 
which ways?  
 
13.  Have you ever had any other training for your job? When?  By whom? 
What type of training did you receive? (ex. mining techniques, valuation skills, the role of licenses, 
health and safety, your rights and obligations). Was the training helpful for you? And how?  
 
14. Did you share with anyone else about what you learnt? Who did you teach? How did you 
teach them?  
 
15. Have you had the chance to give anyone feedback about how the laws work for you? 
Who? (ex. government, your superior, unions, industry association, researchers) 
What did you want them to know from you? What did they want to know from you?  
How do you think that this information was used?  
 
16. Is there anything else that you want to add, or to ask me? 
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Questions for government regulators. Administered in Sierra Leone, Sept 2008.  
 
(Mines monitoring officers, local government, field gold diamond officers, license issuers) 
 




Can I use your name in my paper? Yes / No 
If no, can I use your responses anonymously? Yes / No 
  
Types of Work: 
 
1.  What is your job title? What are your main duties? Please give a brief description  
 
2.  Do you face obstacles to effective conduct of your duties? If yes, what are they? (ex. resources, 
information, equipment) 
 
3.  Do you get assistance (money or supplies) from any other sources? Yes / No 
If yes, from what individual, agency or organisations?  
 
4.  Is the assistance given to your agency reciprocated in some way by you (or your 
organisation)? In what ways?   
 
Capacity Building for Kimberley: 
 
5.  Have you found that the laws/rules to trading in the diamond industry have changed since 
2002? If yes, how have they changed? 
 
6.  What is your understanding of the reason for the laws and regulations? 
What is your role in implementing the laws?  
 
7.  Have the changes in laws affected your work? (positively / negatively) 
 
8.  Have you ever received training related to your job? (Yes / No) 
What type of training did you have? Was it helpful?  
Have you had training often (How many training you undergone in the last 2 years)? 
 
9.  In what other ways have you learnt how to do your job?  
 
10.  Have you ever explained to anyone else about the laws of diamond trading? (Yes / No) 
Who did you teach? What did you teach them?  
 
11.  Have you had the chance to give anyone feedback about how the laws work for you? 
Who? (ex. government, your superior, unions, industry association, researchers)  
What did you want them to know from you?  
What did they want to know?  
How do you think that this information was used?  
 
12.  Is there anything else that you would like to add (or to ask me)?  
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Questions for civil society organisations and donors. Administered in Sierra Leone, Sept, 
2008.  
 




Can I use your name in my paper? Yes / No 
If no, can I use your responses anonymously? Yes / No 
  
Types of Work: 
 
1.  What organisation do you work for?  
And how does it relate with the Sierra Leone diamond industry? 
  
2.  What is your job title? Main duties? Please describe.  
 
3.  Does your organisation have any programs/projects to support the diamond trade/Kimberley 
Process? Please describe them?  
 
4.  Do you collaborate with any other institutions to carry out your projects?  
If yes, who? (ex. government of SL, international donors, civil society or industry) 
In what capacity? 
 
5.  Does your work involve training and capacity building within the diamond industry? If yes, for 
whom? (ex. diggers, miners, license holders, community). Please describe.  
 
Capacity Building for Kimberley: 
 
6.  Where do you and your organisation get most of your information/research from?  
(ex. local community, government, academic, international) 
 
7.  To whom, and in what ways do you disseminate information?  
 
8.  How do you communicate, share, receive and store information? Please elaborate on 
processes? 
 
9.  Does sharing of knowledge and experience with others help your organisation get stronger? If 
yes, how? 
 
10.  Have you ever participated in research? What was the research about? And what was your 
role? 
 
11. To what extent has the fact that you participated in research influenced your (organisations) 
actions?  (Specific research projects and examples of organisational change from research) 
 
12.  Beyond your participation in the research process, to what extent have its findings influenced 
your organisation’s work? Please specify? 
 
13.  Is there anything else that you want to add, or ask me?  
 
 
 
